Alegeri parlamentare anticipate din Republica Moldova, 28.11.2010

Rezultate finale

Voturi centralizate = 100%

Partidul Comunistilor din Republica Moldova PCRM 39,30%, 42 mandate (alegeri 07/2009: 44,69%, 48 mandate)

Partidul Liberal Democrat din Moldova PLDM 29,40%, 32 mandate (alegeri 07/2009: 16,57%, 18 mandate)

Partidul Democrat din Moldova PDM 12,70%, 12 mandate (alegeri 07/2009: 12,54%, 13 mandate)

Partidul Liberal PL 10,0%, 12 mandate (alegeri 07/2009, 14,68%, 15 mandate)

Alianta Moldova Noastra AMN 2,1%, 0 mandate

Miscarea „Actiunea Europeana” MAE 1,2%, o mandate

Partidul Conservator  PC 0,1%, 0 mandate

Partidul National Liberal PNL 0,6%, 0 mandate

Partidul Social Democrat PSD 0,5%, 0 mandate

Partidul „Moldova Unita” PMU 0,5%, 0 mandate

Partidul Popular Crestin Democrat PPCD 0,5%, o mandate

Informatii generale

Astăzi, 28 noiembrie 2010, se desfăşoară alegerile în Parlamentul Republici Moldova, în cadrul cărora vor fi aleşi 101 deputaţi.

Secţiile de votare sînt deschise între orele 7:00 şi 21:00.

La alegeri participă 39 concurenţi electorali: 20 partide politice şi 19 candidaţi independenţi.

Pentru a accede în Parlament, este necesară depăşirea următorului prag minim de reprezentare:

pentru partide politice — 4%,

pentru un candidat independent — 2%.

Alegerile vor fi declarate valabile dacă la ele vor participa mai mult de 1/3 din numărul persoanelor înscrise în listele electorale.

Participarea la vot

Participarea la vot:

orele 12.45: 22,46% (alegeri parlamentare 07/2009, orele 12.45: 30%)

orele 15.45: participare la vot: 41,87% (alegeri parlamentare 07/2009, orele 15,45:40%)

orele 17.00: potrivit celor mai recente date, prezentate de Comisia Electorală Centrală, cu o prezență la vot de 42%, adică peste 1/3 dintre alegători, alegerile parlamentare pot fi considerate valide.
orele 18.45: participare la vot: 54,95% (alegeri parlamentare 07/2009, orele 18.45: 49.30%)
orele 23.00: Potrivit CEC, alegerile anticipate din 28 noiembrie 2010 în Parlamentul Republicii Moldova sînt considerate valabile, prezenţa la vot a alegătorilor fiind de 59.10%


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Concurenti electorali

Partidul Naţional Liberal (PNL)

Partidul Democrat din Moldova (PDM)

Partidul Liberal (PL)

Partidul “Moldova Unită — Единая Молдова” (PMUEM)

Partidul Popular Creştin Democrat (PPCD)

Mişcarea “Acţiunea Europeană” (MAE)

Partidul “Patrioţii Moldovei” (PPM)

Partidul “Pentru Neam şi Ţară” (PpNŢ)

Partidul Republican din Moldova (PRM)

Alianţa “Moldova Noastră” (AMN)

Partidul Umanist din Moldova (PUM)

Partidul Comuniştilor din Republica Moldova (PCRM)

Partidul Liberal Democrat din Moldova (PLDM)

Valeriu Pleşca (candidat independent)

Partidul Conservator (PC)

Gabriel Stati (candidat independent)

Partidul Popular Republican (PPR)

Mişcarea social-politică “Ravnopravie” (MR)

Partidul Social Democrat (PSD)

Victor Stepaniuc (candidat independent)

Mişcarea social-politică a Romilor din Republica Moldova (MRRM)

Evghenii Nazarenco (candidat independent)

Gheorghe Russu (candidat independent)

Partidul Muncii (PM)

Maia Laguta (candidat independent)

Partidul Ecologist “Alianţa Verde” din Moldova (PEMAVE)

Tatiana Ţîmbalist (candidat independent)

Romeo Cereteu (candidat independent)

Afanasie Bîrladeanu (candidat independent)

Leonid Volneanschi (candidat independent), s-a retras din competiţia electorală

Oleg Bolotnicov (candidat independent)

Oleg Cazac (candidat independent)

Vitalie Ţaulean (candidat independent)

Elena Burghilă-Leonte (candidat independent)

Valentina Cuşnir (candidat independent)

Alexandru Demian (candidat independent)

Sergiu Iachim (candidat independent)

Natalia Axenova (candidat independent)

Vasile Lupaşcu (candidat independent)

Sergiu Banari (candidat independent)

Citeste la Dreapta!


Republica Moldova analizata de George Friedman (

Sursa informationala:

Autor: George Friedman

Moldova is a country in need of explanation, two explanations in fact. First, there is the question of what kind of country Moldova is. Second, there is the question of why anyone should care. Oddly, I went to Moldova thinking I knew the answer to the second question but not the first. I came away unsure of either. Let’s begin with the second question: Why does Moldova matter?

The second article in this series, “Borderlands,” described the re-emergence of Russian regional power following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Russian national security is dependent on two countries that became independent following the collapse. Belarus is the buffer between Russia and Europe on the North European Plain. Ukraine is the buffer between Russia and the Carpathian Mountains. From the Russian point of view, dominating these countries is less important than Europe and the United States not dominating them. The Russians have achieved this and perhaps more.

Ukraine is Russia’s southwestern anchor and its Achilles’ heel. It is difficult for Russia to be secure without Ukraine both for economic and strategic reasons. Russia would be hard to defend if Ukraine were under the control of a hostile power. What Ukraine is to Russia, Moldova is to Ukraine. It is a salient that makes Ukraine difficult to defend, and if Ukraine can’t be defended Russia can’t be defended either. Or so my reasoning went at the beginning of my visit.

Moldova’s Strategic Position

I had strong historical arguments for this. My thinking was in line with Stalin’s. In 1939, the Soviets signed a nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany. One part of the agreement secretly partitioned Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union. Another part of the treaty secretly ceded Bessarabia to the Soviets, even though Bessarabia was part of Romania. The Soviets seized Bessarabia in 1940, renaming it the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic and changing its boundaries somewhat. Bessarabia can thus be thought of as Moldova’s predecessor.

There were many things the Soviets might have demanded from the Germans, but this, along with eastern Poland, was what they asked for. The reason was strategic:

  1. The eastern frontier of Bessarabia, and therefore of Romania, was less than 50 miles from the Soviet port of Odessa, the Soviet Union’s major outlet to the Black and Mediterranean seas.
  2. Romania was anchored in the east on the Dniester River. Should the Soviets decide to attack westward at any point, the Dniester was a formidable defensive line.
  3. By taking Bessarabia, the Soviets eliminated part of a salient from which Kiev could be threatened.
  4. The Soviets pushed their frontier west to the Prut River.
  5. The Soviets could interdict the Danube from Bessarabia. Close the Danube and European trade — in this case, German trade — would be damaged.

Stalin wanted to increase Ukraine’s security and increase Romania’s and the Danube basin’s vulnerability. As obscure as it was to the rest of the world, Bessarabia became a key piece on the chessboard between Hitler and Stalin, just as the Russian and Ottoman empires had sought after it before. Places that are of little interest to the rest of the world can be of great importance to great powers.

As it was, the bet didn’t pay off for Stalin, as Hitler attacked the Soviets and quickly seized all the regions conceded to them. But what Stalin lost in 1941, he regained in 1944. He had no intention of returning Bessarabia to Romania. He shifted some Moldovan territory to Ukraine and transferred some Ukrainian territory east of the Dniester River to Moldova. Since it was all under Soviet control, these were merely administrative shifts with no strategic significance at the time.

After the Soviet collapse, this territory became the Republic of Moldova. The portion east of the Dniester revolted with Russian support, and Moldova lost effective control of what was called Transdniestria. Moldova remained in control of the area between the Prut and Dniester rivers, for about 18 years a fairly insignificant region. Indeed, from a global point of view, Moldova was just a place on a map until 2010. The Ukrainian elections of 2010 brought what seems to be a pro-Russian government to power, repudiating the Orange Revolution. As I argued in “Borderlands,” this was a key step in the resurrection of Russian strategic power. Consequently, Moldova began to shift from being a piece of land between two rivers to being a strategic asset for both the Russians and any Western entity that might wish to contain or threaten Ukraine and therefore Russia.

Let me emphasize the idea that it “began to shift,” not that it is now a strategic asset. This is an unfolding process. Its importance depends on three things:

These are all moving parts; none is in place. Moldova is therefore a place of emerging importance, as the saying goes. But however slow this process, this fairly obscure country has lost its insignificance, as it does whenever great powers clash in this part of the world.

This is why I wanted to visit Moldova: It seemed to be evolving into strategic terrain, and I wanted to understand it.

The Moldovan Identity

Moldova, of course, is not just a strategic chip. It is a place where people live, caught between their Romanian heritage and their Soviet past. It is a mistake to think of Moldova simply as part of the Romania that had been taken by the Soviets, which once freed from Soviet domination would simply rejoin Romania. Seventy years after the partition, Moldova has become more than a Romanian province, far from a Russian province and something less than a nation. This is where geopolitics and social reality begin to collide.

The Soviets brutalized Moldova. I had a conversation with a Moldovan journalist in which he described how he and his family had been deported in 1948 to Tomsk in Siberia. He put it almost casually; it was the common heritage of Moldovans. Stalin was concerned that the Moldovans would want to rejoin Romania, and although Romania was a Soviet satellite, Stalin didn’t want to take any chances. His solution, repeated many times in many places in the Soviet Union, was the deportation of the Romanian population, importing Russians, a small famine and the terror designed to break the Moldovan spirit.

The difference between Eastern Europe and the former republics of the Soviet Union was driven home to me in Moldova. In the Eastern European countries, the Soviet era is regarded as a nightmare and the Russians are deeply distrusted and feared to this day. In Moldova, there is genuine nostalgia for the Soviet period as there is in other parts of the former Soviet Union. Indeed, in Moldova communist rule didn’t end in 1992. The Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM), heir to the Communist Party that was banned, continued to rule Moldova until 2009. The PCRM was not ideologically communist; it had no real ideology at all. What it offered was continued ties to Russia and a sense of continuity to a country that preferred the familiar.

Bessarabia was a province of Romania, and Bessarabians generally spoke Romanian. In today’s Moldova, Romanian is not the only language spoken. As in most former Soviet republics, Russian is widely spoken, and not simply by Russians living there. For a large part of the Moldovan population, Russian is the preferred language. Older Moldovans were taught Russian in school and learned to use it in everyday life. But younger Moldovans also speak Russian, and signs are in Romanian and Russian. In addition, it was pointed out to me (I don’t speak any Romanian) that the Romanian spoken in Moldova is not quite the same as that spoken in Romania today. It has not evolved the same way and has an archaic cast to it. You can easily distinguish between a Romanian and a Moldovan speaking Romanian.

There is genuine tension about this. A member of our staff who lives in Romania accompanied us to Moldova. She told us about going into a store that sold chocolate. (Apparently, it was quite famous for its chocolates.) When she spoke, her Romanian was clearly distinguishable from the Moldovan variety and obviously from Russian. She was not served, was ignored for a while and then shuttled between lines. As she explained it, the Moldovans feel that Romanians look down on them, and so Moldovans resent them. Obviously, this is a single anecdote, but others spoke of this three-way tension between Romanians, Moldovan Romanian speakers and Russian speakers.

This split runs parallel to political fault lines. While there are those who want union with Romania, this is far from the dominant group. The real struggle is between those who back the communists and those who support an independent Moldova oriented toward the European Union and NATO. In broad terms, the communists’ strength is among the rural, poor and elderly. The pro-Western parties are handicapped by being divided into a series of parties that vary by personality more than ideology. This means that the government created after demonstrators routed the communists in 2009 is a highly fragmented coalition made more fragile by the complex interests, personalities and ambitions of each. The communists may not get a majority, but they don’t need as many coalition partners as do the pro-Western parties.

There will be an election Nov. 28. The country has billboards with various candidates all around and rallies throughout the country. Western nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are there. Some are funded, we were told, by the American National Endowment for Democracy, others supported by NATO and so on. The Russians, too, have learned the NGO gambit from the West by watching the various color revolutions. Russian-supported NGOs are in the country, and as one journalist told me, they are serving wine and cheese to young people. That appears to be having an impact.

The real issue behind the complex politics is simply this: What is Moldova? There is consensus on what it is not: It is not going to be a province of Romania. But Moldova was a province of Romania and a Soviet Socialist Republic. What is it now? What does it mean to be a Moldovan? On this question I could see no consensus. There are nations that lack a state, like the Kurds. Moldova is a state that lacks a nation. Nation-building in Moldova is not so much about institutions but about creating a national consensus about the nation.

As in Romania, the pro-Western faction has a clear solution to this problem: membership in NATO and membership in the European Union. If they get this, they feel, they will then have a secure definition of a nation — a European country — and protection from the Russians and others who might threaten them. Romania sees membership in these organizations as a way to overcome its past. Moldova sees this as providing definition to their country. But where being European is a general goal in Romania, it is hotly disputed in Moldova, although what the communists want in practice, aside from power, is quite unclear.

And this is the core problem in Moldova. The pro-Western factions’ idea is to join the European Union and NATO and have that stamp a definition on the country. It does not take into account the powerful Communist Party with its Russian ties, nor does it take into account the substantial portion of the country that identifies with Russia rather than with the West. Some of the pro-Western parties, sensitive to this problem, have reached out to the Russians, either with visits to Moscow or indirectly. Committed to the Western option, they are trying to accommodate pro-Russian sentiment. But squaring the circle is not easy, and the basic divisions remain in place. In that sense, the country is in gridlock. Whoever wins this or succeeding elections governs a country that is significantly divided and with very different ideas about what the country should look like and who should govern it.

An Economy of Shadows

This is made even more difficult when you consider Moldova’s economic condition. It is said to be one of the poorest countries in Europe, if not the poorest. About 12 percent of its gross domestic product is provided by remittances from emigrants working in other European countries, some illegally. This has fallen from 19 percent, not by economic growth, but since the global recession cut remittances. Romania has begun a program of providing Moldovans with Romanian passports. This allows the Moldovans to travel and work anywhere in the European Union. They were already doing this illegally. Now the process of emigration and remittance has become formal. Some in Moldova charge that this is an attempt by Romania to undermine Moldova by encouraging emigration. But given the remittance situation, it is probably a lifeline.

People in Moldova and in Romania have told me that that the largest export of Moldova is women, who are lured into or willingly join (depending on who you might ask) the Moldovan diaspora to work as prostitutes. Some say (and I can’t verify) that Moldovan women constitute the largest number of prostitutes working in Europe’s legal brothels. This is a discussion for which there are few valid statistics and many opinions. Yet in talking to people, the claim does not seem controversial. This is a sign of a desperate country.

Consider this anecdote from a Saturday night spent walking the streets of Chisinau, the capital. The sidewalks of the main street filled with young people, from their late teens to their mid-twenties. I was told that there were no clubs for young people to party in, so they gather in the streets. That’s not all that odd: It reminds me of Queens Boulevard in New York during my high school years. What was odd was the way they clustered in groups of five to 15. At the center of each group was a small number of girls, one to three, all dressed stunningly compared to the boys, who were one cut above slobs. The oddity was the extent to which the boys outnumbered girls. I could never find out if the other girls were home with their parents or there was a shortage of young women. Regardless, my wife assured me the girls were not wearing cheap clothes; she estimated the boots alone ran into the hundreds of dollars.

I don’t quite know how to read this, but add to this the fact that there were bank branches up and down the main street. When we visited a small town north of the capital, it also had a string of bank branches lining the street. Bank branches are expensive to build and maintain. They need depositors to keep them going, and when you have seven competing banks in a small town that means there is money there. Certainly, the town didn’t look poor.

So, we have a paradox. The numbers say Moldova is extremely poor, yet there are lots of banks and well and expensively dressed young women. The young men all seemed to share my taste in clothes, which might come from poverty or indifference, so they don’t fit the analysis. But I am fairly confident in saying that the official statistics of Moldova and the economic reality are not in sync.

There are three possible explanations. The first is that remittances are flooding the country, from women or other expatriates, and that the banks are there to service the money coming in. The second is that there is a massive shadow economy that evades regulation, taxation and statistical analysis. The third explanation is that the capital and a few towns are fairly affluent while the rural areas are extraordinarily poor. (I saw some Soviet-era apartments that might confirm that.) I suspect the answer is all three are correct, explaining the split politics in the country.

The Republic of Moldova has a profound identity crisis, a deeply divided political system and an economy which does not have, as they say, full transparency. It is therefore difficult to think about it geopolitically.

Moldova and Strategy

From the Moldovan point of view, at least among the pro-Western factions, Moldova’s strategic problems begin and end with Transdniestria. They want to regain the east bank of the river. The region would have real benefits for Moldova, as it would be its industrial heartland, in relative terms at least. Like some other disputed territories in the former Soviet Union, however, it is the dispute, more than the strategic value of the territory, that is important. It is a rallying point, or at least an attempt to find one. It also a basis for pro-Western groups to attack pro-Russian groups since the Russians protect the breakaway region.

The Germans, who are getting close to the Russians, appear to be trying to facilitate negotiations regarding Transdniestria. The Russians may accommodate the Germans. But if they do, I doubt the outcome will deny the Russians control of the east bank of the Dniester. From the Russian point of view, hostile forces east of the Dniester could threaten Odessa, and they see no reason to leave the Dniester River regardless of how benign conditions appear right now. The Russian view, driven home by history, is that benign situations can turn malignant with remarkable speed.

There is an oddity here, of course. I am talking about Russian troops on the Dniester, but this in a country surrounded by Ukraine, not Russia. The Russians are supporting the Transdniestrian republic while the Ukrainians have not. Since 1992, the Ukrainians have not made an effective demand for the Russians to stop interfering in what is essentially a Ukrainian-Moldovan issue. This might be because the Ukrainians don’t want other lands that had been taken from Moldova and given to Ukraine put on the table as a bargaining chip. But I suspect the reason is simpler: Regardless of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russians are the ones concerned about things like a defensive river position while the Ukrainians see the matter with more detachment.

A Net Assessment

On a map, Moldova is valuable real estate. It is a region that in the hands of NATO or any other Western power could provide leverage against Russian power, and perhaps strengthen Ukraine’s desire to resist Russia. Putting NATO troops close to Odessa, a Ukrainian port Russians depend on, would cause the Russians to be cautious. The problem is that the Russians clearly understand this and are doing what they can to create a pro-Russian state in Moldova, or at least a state sufficiently unstable that no one can use it to threaten the Russians.

Moldova is caught between its Romanian roots and its Soviet past. It has not developed a national identity independent of these two poles. Moldova is a borderland-within-a-borderland. It is a place of foreign influences from all sides. But it is a place without a clear center. On one side, there is nostalgia for the good old days of the Soviet Union — which gives you a sense of how bad things are now for many Moldovans. On the other side is hope that the European Union and NATO will create and defend a nation that doesn’t exist.

If geopolitics were a theoretical game, then the logical move would be to integrate Moldova into NATO immediately and make it a member of the European Union. There are equally strange nations that are members of each. But geopolitics teaches that the foundation of national strategy is the existence of a nation. That may be obvious, but it is something that needs to be said. I came to Moldova looking in the borderland for a nation that might be a counter to Russian resurgence. I thought I had found the nation on the map. It turned out that while there were people living there, they were not a nation. What appeared promising on a map was very different in reality.

This is not to say that Moldova cannot evolve a sense of nationhood and identity. But such things take a long time to create and rarely emerge peacefully. In the meantime, powerful forces on all sides might make the creation of a Moldovan nation difficult if not impossible. This may well be a case of a state that could forge a nation if it were a member of the European Union and NATO, but the European Union is dealing with Ireland, and NATO has no appetite to confront Russia. This will be up to the Moldovans. It is not clear to me how much time history will give them to reach a consensus.

It is certainly not for me to advise the Moldovans, since I don’t share their fate. But given that I won’t be listened to anyway, I will offer this observation. Moldova was once part of Romania. It was once part of the Soviet Union. Moldova makes a great deal of sense as part of something. The Soviet Union is gone. Europe has more problems than it can handle already; it is not looking for more. Romania is still there. It is not a perfect solution, and certainly not one many Moldovans would welcome, but it is a solution, however imperfect.

Filosofia dreptei: Viziunea economică a lui Petre Ţutea

Autor: Varujan Vosganian

Sursa informationala:

Ca tot restul gîndirii sale, viziunea economicã a lui Petre Tutea a fost surprinzãtor de vie si de clarã în temeiurile ei. Si, bineînteles, lapidarã ca tot ce a produs acest om în anii sãi venerabili (1), prea neastâmpãrat, prea grãbit de a-si salva gândurile din fata mortii si, de aceea, prea putin rãbdãtor sã se aseze la masa de scris.

S-ar putea obiecta faptul cã ceea ce ne-a rãmas de la Petre Tutea, în anii din urmã, este prea putin pentru a putea alcãtui propriu-zis o viziune economicã. Reflectiile sale cu continut economic nu depãsesc o duzinã de pagini si lor li s-ar putea spune mai degrabã “consideratii de naturã economicã”. Cu toate acestea, asa cum îmi propun sã arãt în paginile urmãtoare, Tutea schiteazã, în aceste câteva texte, o viziune care, în baza crochiurilor sale, ar putea da continut unei teorii economice închegate.

Cea dintâi concluzie, parcurgând aceste texte privitoare la specificul economic al tranzitiei, este aceea cã ele sunt parte integrantã a viziunii sale despre lume, asa cum a exprimat-o în toate scrierile si reflectiile sale. Ne-am fi putut astepta de la un gânditor crestin care vorbeste cu atâta patos despre valorile rurale, despre traditia culturalã, crestinã si nationalã a românilor, sã îmbrãtiseze o atitudine idilicã sau poporanistã, în linia unui Aurel C. Popovici ori Nicolae Iorga. Atitudinea lui Petre Tutea este însã surprinzãtoare prin modernitatea si pragmatismul ei. El nu face concesii utopiilor, nostalgiilor reactionare. Asezând conceptiile sale economice pe matricea culturalã a românilor, el nu este, totusi, un traditionalist, nici un idealist.

În conceptiile sale economice, Petre Tutea rãmâne un om de dreapta. El anticipeazã o anumitã tendintã a dreptei românesti de azi de a se prezenta ca o sintezã doctrinarã, în conceptia lui întâlnindu-se elemente de naturã liberalã, conservatoare ori crestin-democratã. În acest fel, desi perioada sa de formare filosoficã ar fi putut sã sugereze acest lucru, economistul Tutea nu se înscrie decât în foarte micã mãsurã pe linia dreptei culturale interbelice. Ceea ce îl deosebeste de conceptiile unui Mihail Manoilescu ori Constantin Rãdulescu-Motru este faptul cã viziunea sa economicã este purificatã de excese etniciste si de atitudini reactionare. Gândirea economicã a lui Petre Tutea este una realistã, profund pozitivã.

Petre Tutea a explicat mai limpede ca nimeni altul, mai ales pentru acele vremuri confuze de debut al tranzitiei, ===>cã optiunea fundamentalã este aceea între socialism si capitalism.<=== Tutea a fost un critic necrutãtor al comunismului si, în consecintã, al egalitarismului si al centralismului (2). El s-a dovedit foarte neîncrezãtor în solutiile pe care le-ar putea oferi alte variante de stânga, cum ar fi socialismul si social-democratia, pe care le-a catalogat, cu ironie, drept “sprit” ori “lapte bãtut” al comunismului (3).

Capitalismul, pe care Tutea nu-l prea denumeste ca atare, dar pe care îl sugereazã constant, este rezultatul unui proces de liberalizare. Acesta este unul dintre aspectele importante care îl deosebesc pe Tutea de dreapta interbelicã. El a înteles cu mult înaintea altora cã tranzitia presupune un proces profund de modernizare si de liberalizare. Pornind de la avatarurile economiei centralizate, Tutea socoteste cã primul pas este redimensionarea rolului statului pe douã directii fundamentale: cea dintâi este legatã de diminuarea rolului statului ca agent economic, iar cea de-a doua este legatã de sporirea fortei legii si a fortei pietei. Tendinta cãtre echilibru trebuie dictatã de fortele pietei si nu trebuie sã fie consecinta unei interventii statale, care este îndeobste brutalã si ineficientã. Iar preponderenta proprietãtii de stat trebuie înlocuitã neîntârziat cu dezvoltarea proprietãtii private (4).

Atitudinea lui Petre Tutea în ceea ce priveste trecerea de la socialism la capitalism este fãrã înconjur liberalã (5). În aceastã privintã, el este categoric în a afirma cã gradul de bunãstare al societãtii este strâns legat de dezvoltarea pietei si de promovarea liberei initiative.

Remarcabil este faptul cã, într-o vreme în care marea industrie româneascã era abordatã depreciativ, iar numerosi oameni politici si economisti îndreptau prioritãtile strategice cãtre agriculturã ori cãtre dezvoltarea întreprinderilor mici si mijlocii, Petre Tutea considera drept indispensabilã dezvoltarea marii industrii. El socotea, în mod corect, cã redimensionarea industrialã constituie o prioritate si cã marea industrie trebuie sã devinã suportul celorlalte domenii. Aceastã asociere între modernizare si industrializare este una dintre dimensiunile distincte ale lui Tutea, care-l distinge irevocabil de orice tentativã “poporanistã”, vãdind un gânditor necontaminat de antimodernismul radical al dreptei interbelice. Industrializarea poate fi suport al modernizãrii în ideea în care ea se întemeiazã pe proprietatea privatã si este corelatã cu dezvoltarea de ansamblu a economiei. Ideea cã dezvoltarea agriculturii nu se poate face fãrã industrializare si cã evolutia acestor douã sectoare trebuie corelatã este corectã, iar ignorarea ei a costat mult economia româneascã în tranzitie (6).

Modernizarea tehnologicã necesitã o modernizare institutionalã. Tutea a rostit câteva fraze memorabile despre unicitatea fiintei umane si despre apartenenta de neam în dobândirea harului unicitãtii. Constiinta de neam (7) este reperul absolut al gândirii sale. Aceastã dragoste pentru neamul românesc, pe care o socotesc exemplarã, nu îl orbeste pe Tutea, ci îl ajutã sã vadã limpede, si anume în folosul neamului pe care îl iubeste cu toatã fiinta sa. Este semnificativ, de aceea, modul în care Tutea concepe modernizarea institutionalã: nu ca pe o tentativã încãpãtânatã spre originalitate, ci ca pe o aplicare a unor experiente deja petrecute si de succes în alte tãri. În cazul lui Tutea, “patriotismul national” (întrebuintez aici acest termen al lui D. Gusti, mult mai potrivit decât cel de “nationalism”) nu este autarhic si xenofob, ci, dimpotrivã, este deschis cãtre lume si purtãtor al spiritului critic. În aceastã privintã, chiar dacã el însusi nutreste o anumitã rezervã despre modul în care democratia poate proteja valoarea umanã în fata mediocritãtii, considerã însusirea valorilor democratice ca pe o sansã si chiar ca pe o conditie a desprinderii de comunism.

În mod corect, Tutea socoteste drept obiectiv central al liberalizãrii dezvoltarea si consolidarea pietelor. Un rol central îl joacã pietele de capital, cu deosebire bursele. Dacã socotim cã prima legislatie a burselor din România a fost datã abia în 1994, iar Bursa de Valori Bucuresti a început, practic, sã functioneze doi ani mai târziu, declaratiile lui Petre Tutea din anul 1990  sunt cu atât mai remarcabile.

Ca om de dreapta, Tutea pune si în centrul viziunii sale economice omul. Acesta poartã, în perspectiva datã, chipul întreprinzãtorului privat. În toate reflectiile sale de naturã economicã, Petre Tutea are grijã sã accentueze asupra importantei fundamentale a spiritului antreprenorial si asupra necesitãtii ca statul sã acorde tot sprijinul întreprinzãtorului privat. În aceastã privintã, el împãrtãseste definitia pe care Joseph A. Schumpeter ori Werner Sombart o dau întreprinzãtorului, ca fiind cel care descoperã oportunitãti si le dã o cale durabilã de dezvoltare. Modul în care Petre Tutea creioneazã portretul întreprinzãtorului este de esentã pur liberalã. Ceea ce caracterizeazã în primul rând spiritul de întreprindere este însusirea sa de a fi liber si de a putea actiona astfel în conditiile pietei. Legãtura dintre libertate si proprietate este directã si necesarã (8).

Tutea este însã constient de faptul cã liberalizarea poate avea, pentru un popor încã nedezmeticit dupã atâtea decenii de comunism, efecte contrare, care s-o devieze cãtre haos. Aici intervine cea de-a doua componentã a gândirii de dreapta ca sintezã doctrinarã, pe care o aminteam în introducerea acestui studiu. Fiind liberal în viziunea sa despre trecerea de la socialism la capitalism, Tutea nu e mai putin conservator în ce priveste trecerea de la totalitarism la democratie. Viziunea sa este astfel apropiatã de linia liberalismului reprezentat de Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich A. Hayek sau Milton Friedman. Adept al reducerii rolului statului în economie, Tutea socoteste cã acest proces trebuie însotit de un altul, al cresterii rolului statului ca apãrãtor al legii si al pietelor. Tendinta actualã de însotire a liberalizãrii economice de guvernãri social-democrate este sever sanctionatã de Tutea, care vede ca deopotrivã necesare, pe modelul conservatorismului britanic sau al republicanismului american, atât o sporire de facturã conservatoare a autoritãtii statului, cât si o tranzitie economicã de facturã liberalã (9). Constient de riscurile pe care un model de guvernare autoritarã le poate avea pentru o tarã abia iesitã din comunism, Tutea vede solutia ca fiind una democraticã, deplângând lipsa unei elite politice care sã poatã gestiona acest proces (10).

Petre Tutea este, întâi de toate, un gânditor crestin. Desi viziunea sa economicã este, cum am arãtat, una pragmaticã, ea rãmâne profund atasatã valorilor crestine. Este constient de faptul cã actiunea economicã, îndreptatã fiind cu deosebire cãtre crearea de avutie materialã, poate deveni indiferentã fatã de valorile spirituale, cu deosebire fatã de cele crestine. Astfel, Petre Tutea introduce în consideratiile sale economice anumite elemente de naturã crestin-democratã, pornind de la un temei simplu, si anume acela cã tranzitia, înainte de a fi un proces economic sau politic, este un proces profund cultural. În orice tip de activitate, inclusiv în cea economicã, omul trebuie, dupã lungi decenii de rãtãcire, sã se regãseascã, întâi de toate, pe sine însusi. Libertatea trebuie pusã în slujba spiritului, iar spiritul întreprinzãtor trebuie sã fie întâi de toate spirit si în acest fel sã-si dezvolte capacitatea de a întreprinde. Liberalismul economic nu trebuie sã se îndepãrteze – asa cum în mod gresit s-a întâmplat, spune Tutea, în vremea Revolutiei franceze – de spiritul crestin. Aceasta face ca actiunea economicã sã evite “gândirea negustoreascã”, iar întreprinzãtorii sã se apropie de Dumnezeu nu “doar ca sã le binecuvânteze prãvãliile”, asa cum fac, dupã pãrerea sa, americanii (11). Durabilitate conferã, spune Tutea, credinta în Dumnezeu si constiinta de neam. Iesit din aceste hotare, orice popor, oricâtã bunãstare ar avea, riscã sã îmbãtrâneascã.

Petre Tutea este, în acest fel, promotor al tendintelor dreptei românesti actuale care, pãstrând numeroase elemente ale traditiei culturale si politice ale gândirii de dreapta, se desparte, totusi, de caracterul reactionar al acesteia. Dreapta este chematã astãzi nu sã reziste asalturilor modernitãtii, ci chiar sã o creeze, tinându-i însã în frâu excesele conjuncturale. Gândirea economicã a lui Tutea este pozitivã si pragmaticã, deosebit de novatoare pentru realitãtile economice ale anului 1990 (12). Caracterul sãu sintetic, preluând elemente de doctrinã liberalã, crestin-democratã si conservatoare, prezintã dreapta actualã ca pe o posibilã sintezã doctrinarã, ceea ce îi sporeste gradul de adecvare la realitãti si coerenta ideologicã. Viziunea sa se asazã pe câteva linii importante ale tranzitiei economice: redimensionarea rolului statului, prin reducerea functiei sale economice si cresterea functiunilor sale de stat de drept; modernizarea si corelarea institutionalã; stimularea initiativei particulare; dezvoltarea liberei competitii; dezvoltarea si consolidarea pietelor; redimensionarea industrialã; instituirea unei etici a economiei de piatã.

Din reflectiile sale lipseste populismul, dar nu si încrederea sa netãrmuritã în destinul neamului românesc: “În principiu, am certitudinea invincibilitãtii poporului român. […] E atât de viguros neamul ãsta al nostru, cã nu mã îndoiesc cã virtutile îl scot din impas. Asta e certitudinea mea. Istoria lui îmi dã argumente în sprijinul credintei mele cã poporul român nu poate fi înfrânt” (13).

1 Sunt avute în vedere aici consideraţiile sale târzii, incluse în volumele publicate, sau înregistrate de discipoli. În ambiţiosul plan (nerealizat ca atare) al operei sale figura şi un Tratat de economie politică.

2 Iată câteva texte edificatoare: „Şi la comunişti sunt stăpâni şi slugi, dar sunt ipocriţi, pentru  că ei ştiu că egalitatea oamenilor nu poate nicăieri exista; sunt perfect escroci tocmai pentru că afirmă că esenţa comunismului este egalitatea reală a oamenilor. Premisa aceasta a egalităţii absolute este nulă” (Petre Ţuţea, Între Dumnezeu şi neamul meu, Fundaţia Anastasia-Editura Arta Grafică, Bucureşti, 1992, p. 80.); „Comuniştii sunt văcari. Ei consideră oamenii aşa cum consideră văcarii cirezile. Un comunist e un neom. Cum poţi gândi egalitatea absolută – că aşa trebuie să fie gândită ca să fii comunist – când nici nu ieşi bine pe stradă şi te întâlneşti cu ea, cu inegalitatea ?” (ibidem, p. 326); „Comunismul e cea mai mare aflare-în-treabă din istoria omenirii” (322 de vorbe memorabile ale lui Petre Ţuţea, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1997, sub titlul COMUNISM, p. 27); „Comunismul e o crimă continuă” (ibidem, p. 28); „Nu se poate face economie în comunism şi de către comunişti. Ăştia nu sunt în stare să conducă nici măcar o comună rurală: încurcă apele, înfundă fântânile… […] Comunismul este un cancer social; unde se instalează, rămâne pustiu” (ibidem, p. 29).

3 Altădată defineşte în mod categoric ansamblul acestora: „Toate formele de stânga violează cotidian ordinea naturală a lui Dumnezeu” (Între Dumnezeu şi neamul meu, ed. cit., p. 19).

4 „Coordonatele indiscutabile [ale reformei socio-economice – n. n.] sunt: proprietatea privată, iniţiativa particulară şi o ordine de drept atât de obiectiv formulată încât subiecţii sociali să-şi întărească atitudinile sub cooperare liberă; adică legile unei societăţi moderne trebuie să fie atât de bine întocmite […] încât să nu se simtă prezenţa normelor care guvernează Cetatea. Cetăţeanul trebuie să fie asigurat prin normele şi legile vieţii sociale fără să simtă prezenţa coercitivă a acestora”(Între Dumnezeu şi neamul meu, ed. cit., p. 362).

5 O spune chiar el: „Eu sunt economist liberal. În spatele liberalismului stă tirania Evului Mediu, iar în faţă – haosul roşu” (Între Dumnezeu şi neamul meu, ed. cit., p. 362 ; cf. şi Radu Preda, Jurnal cu Petre Ţuţea, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1992, p. 111). Să precizăm, în treacăt, că Petre Ţuţea a murit (3 decembrie 1991) ca membru principial al Partidului Naţional-Liberal (Între Dumnezeu şi neamul meu, ed. cit., p. 22 ). Pentru un mic ansamblu de consideraţii despre LIBERALISM, cf. şi 322 de vorbe memorabile ale lui Petre Ţuţea, ed. cit., sub titlul respectiv).

6 „Dacă prin absurd mi s-ar fi dat mie puterea [la 20 mai 1990 – n. n.], prima hotărâre pe care aş fi luat-o ar fi fost privatizarea, însemnând reconstrucţia celor două comune: comuna rurală, agrară, întemeiată pe gospodarul dibaci şi priceput, şi comuna urbană, industrială, guvernată de întreprinderi, de aceşti giganţi ai lumii moderne. Asta era privatizarea şi în imaginea României Mari” (interviu acordat lui Marcel Petrişor, în primăvara lui 1991, pentru revista Puncte cardinale din Sibiu ; cf. şi Între Dumnezeu şi neamul meu, ed. cit., pp. 280-281).

7 „Mă mişc între Dumnezeu şi neamul din care fac parte. În afară de aceşti termeni, nu văd nimic semnificativ între cer şi pământ” (Între Dumnezeu şi neamul meu, ed. cit., p. 12).

8 „Nu e de conceput libertate fără proprietate. Orice om trebuie să fie considerat proprietar individual ipotetic, chiar dacă nu posedă nimic” (322 de vorbe memorabile ale lui Petre Ţuţea, ed. cit., sub titlul PROPRIETATE).

9 „Cred că ar fi totuşi optimă o conducere conservatoare realizată, însă, într-un climat democratic. Adică un partid conservator, tradiţionalist, naţionalist, într-un climat liberal. Adică să nu facă din conservatorism instrument de tiranie, că eu nu pot să accept în numele nici unei idei, chiar dacă este un ideal, mă rog, roz sau suprem, să asupresc nici o celulă dintr-un om” (322 de vorbe memorabile ale lui Petre Ţuţea, ed. cit., sub titlul CONSERVATORI).

10 „E vicios cercul: ieşiţi dintr-o dictatură smintită, cu economia mâncată de cancerul comunist, suntem ahtiaţi după democraţie, ca fata mare după măritiş. Dar o economie aşa de ruinată nu se poate reface decât într-un cadru de ordine autoritară, pe care, din păcate, democraţia nu-l poate oferi. Trebuie ajuns la liberalism, dar nu pe calea social-democraţiei, care e laptele bătut al comunismului… La noi, însă, nu mi se pare posibilă, deocamdată, o soluţie autoritară şi de-aia mă tem că criza se va prelungi atât cât va dura beţia leneşă a libertăţii şi-a drepturilor fără datorii. N-am încredere în politicienii de acum, nici în bunăvoinţa Occidentului, dar cred în Dumnezeu şi în instinctul de conservare al poporului român” (interviu acordat lui Marcel Petrişor, pentru revista Puncte cardinale, în primăvara lui 1991).

11 Cf. Între Dumnezeu şi neamul meu, ed. cit., p. 297.

12 Cum spune el însuşi: „Conservatorii mari nu sunt reacţionari, pentru că au de partea lor legile eterne ale lui Dumnezeu” (Între Dumnezeu şi neamul meu, ed. cit., p. 71).

13 322 de vorbe memorabile ale lui Petre Ţuţea, ed. cit., sub titlul POPORUL ROMÂN

Alianta Dreptei CiU favorita alegerilor regionale din Catalunia

Duminica, 28 noiembrie 2010, se vor desfasura alegeri parlamentare in Catalunia. In sondaje alianta dreptei formata din liberalii catalani CDC si crestindemocrati UDC, reuniti in alianta electorala CiU conduce detasat in optiuniile electoratului si va obtine 48%, respectiv 64 de mandate. PPC, partidul geaman al PD-L se framanta la 10%.

Ultimul sondaj electoral indica urmatoarele optiuni electorale:

CiU (liberali+crestindemocrati) 40% – 65 mandate

PSC-PSOE (socialisti) 20% – 30 mandate

ERC (stanga regionalista) 7% – 11 mandate

PPC (populari) 10% – 14 mandate

ICV-EUiA (socialisti-ecologisti) 9% – 11 mandate

C’s (regionalisti) 4% – 4 mandate

Primul parlament catalan a fost ales in 1283. Catalonii sau opus dictatorului Franco, celule politice ilegale activand in cadrul fan-cluburilor faimosului „Football Club Barcelona”.

Partidul liberal catalan Convergencia Democratica de Catalunya a fost infiintat in ilegalitate la 17 noiembrie 1974. CDC a guvernat Catalunia in perioada 1980-2003.

Alegerile pot fi urmarite pe

Ion I.C. Brătianu: „Sau partidul ma urmeaza cu toata insufletirea, sau nu mai stau in fruntea lui si activez ca simplu particular.”

Ion I. C. Brătianu s-a născut la 20 august 1864 la moşia Florica, în judeţul Argeş. A fost cel mai mare fiu al liderului liberal Ion C. Brătianu şi fratele mai mare al lui Vintilă şi Dinu Brătianu. În 1907 se căsătoreşte cu Eliza, fosta soţie a conservatorului Alexandru Marghiloman.

Pe 24 noiembrie 1927 Ionel Brătianu încetează din viaţă în urma unei laringite infecţioase.

Devine membru al Partidului Naţional Liberal încă din 1895. În acelaşi an candidează la Colegiul I, fiind ales deputat de Gorj. Susţine acceptarea în partid (februarie 1889) a foştilor lideri ai Partidului Social Democrat al Muncitorilor din România (C. Stere, V.G. Morţun, dr. I.G. Radovici, I. Nădejde) creat în anul 1893.

La Congresul P.N.L. din ianuarie 1909, I.I.C. (Ionel) Brătianu este ales preşedinte al partidului, funcţie politică pe care o va păstra până la sfârşitul vieţii sale.

La 2 octombrie 1913, Comitetul Executiv al P.N.L. acceptă propunerea înaintată de Brătianu privind reforma agrară (exproprierea parţială a marii proprietăţi) şi electorală (colegiu electoral unic). Aceste propuneri ale liderului liberal sunt susţinute şi de o importantă parte a oamenilor de stat ai vremii: Regele Carol I, conservatorii democraţi (care susţin însă nişte modificări – două colegii electorale şi expropiere prin cumpărare) şi chiar conservatorii „bătrâni” (expropiere in extremis şi în plan electoral acceptă doar o lărgire a bazei colegiilor existente).

Discursuri parlamentare:

„Pana cand nu vom fi o tara agricola, industriala si comerciala nu va fi dezvoltarea noastra economica completa si desavarsita. Anii de criza ne-au dovedit de ajuns primejdiile unor venituri uniforme.

I.C. Bratianu se opune la vanzarea resurselor naturale catre Marile Puteri:

„Cand pe langa bogatia solului stau muntii nostri inca neexploatati, ===>cand avem la dispozitia noastra petrolul, cand inventiunile moderne fac din electricitate si din fortele hidraulice motoare de mana intai, chemate sa revolutioneze conditiile economice si sociale ale industriei, si cand suntem in asa favorabile situatiuni, in ceea ce priveste caile fluviale si caile maritime – a renunta pentru totdeauna la dezvoltarea industriala ar fi a ne arata oameni cu orizonturi scurte si care nu-si cunosc menirea in lume…”<=== Cuvantare, Adunarea Deputatilor, 1905.

Cuvantare tinuta la Congresul PNL din ianuarie 1909:

In toata activitatea noastra, ca in trecut, sa nu uitam ca, fie in afara, fie inauntru, opera noastra este o opera de progres, de ordine si de pace si ca progresul, ca sa fie sigur, trebuie sa fie facut cu acea perseverenta proprie organismelor sanatoase, iar nu cu zvacniri si framantari„. Noul lider al partidului sublinia importanta respectarii democratismului si a ordinii in organizatiile Partidului National – Liberal care trebuiau sa fie cladite „... pe doua reguli esentiale: libertatea de discutie, pentru a ajunge la participarea constienta a tuturor, disciplina in actiune, fara de care nu se poate.

Sau partidul ma urmeaza cu toata insufletirea,  sau nu mai stau in fruntea lui si activez ca simplu particular.

Sursa: Romania Libera

O lectie de istorie

Autor: Horia Buzatu

Am avut astăzi bucuria de a participa la un eveniment deopotrivă emoționant și tulburător: comemorarea decesului marelui om de stat care a fost Ion. I. C. Brătianu.

Doi profesori ai Universității din București, respectiv Adrian Cioroianu și Ion Bulei, și-au asumat această frumoasa inițiativă și spre mulțumirea mea au ales ca locație a evenimentului, chiar vila familiei Brătianu, la Florica, lângă Pitești.

Adrian Cioroianu, craiovean dar și fost coleg de Parlament, mi-a făcut deosebita cinste de a mă număra printre invitații săi, alături de alți craioveni, profesori ai Universității din Craiova: Sorin Damean, Constanțiu Dinulescu și Florin Olteanu. La rândul meu, am invitat să-mi fie aproape în această zi specială, câțiva dintre tinerii mei prieteni liberali din Craiova.

Ne-am bucurat să găsim la Florica și alți prieteni: fostul deputat PNL Adrian Miuțescu, profesori ai Universității din Pitești, câțiva șefi ai unor instituții de cultură, dar și lideri locali ai mai multor partide.

Ca și în alte rânduri și această zi la Florica a început cu o vizita a Casei Brătienilor. Am revăzut biblioteca în care pe vremuri se găsea una dintre cele mai importante colecții de carte din Europa, din nefericire complet pierdută astăzi. Am revăzut și celebra terasă de la ultimul nivel, unde au avut loc întâlniri ale Consiliului de Miniștri în care au fost luate decizii importante.

Între prelegerile care au urmat, profesorul Bulei m-a impresionat în mod special, atât pe mine cât și pe ceilalți auditori. Domnia sa ne-a citit tuturor, poezii scrise de Ionel Brătianu și dedicate surorii sale, Sabina Cantacuzino ! Iată o latură mai puțin știută a marelui om politc, care scoate în evidență o sensibilitate necunoscută astăzi !

A continuat profesorul Sorin Damean care ne-a îndemnat pe toți să ne cinstim eroii neamului nu doar la anivesări în cifre rotunde, din cinci în cinci, sau din zece în zece ani. Avem nevoie să ne gândim le eroii noștrii în fiecare zi, nu doar la aniversări, a mai spus domnia sa.

Aș mai adăuga aici și intervenția profesorului Dinulescu care a vorbit despre legăturile speciale dintre Ion I. C. Brătianu și generalul Radu Rosetti, autor de studii și teorie militară de mare valoare în epocă.

În ce mă privește, am vorbit despre importanța lui Ion I. C. Brătianu în crearea statului român modern și despre colaborarea benefică pentru țară între familia Brătianu și Regii României. De altfel, eu cred că datorită acestei excepționale relații, întinsă peste zeci de ani a fost posibile toate realizările noastre naționale, dintre care cea mai importantă rămâne evoluția de la Principatele Române, așa cum le-a găsit Regele Carol I, la România Mare, așa cum s-a făcut sub Regele Ferdinand, la 1 decembrie 1918. În tot acest timp, dar și după aceea, Brătienii s-au găsit pretutindeni: în Partidul Național Liberal, pe care l-au și creat alături de alți vizionari ai vremii, în guvernele României, pe care le-au condus bine, chiar dacă au înfruntat criza economică din 1929 sau războaiele mondiale. Dar mai ales, Brătienii s-au găsit alături de Casa Regală a României .

Așadar, ziua de azi ne-a oferit tuturor celor prezenți la vila Florica prilejul de a ne bucura de evocări și amintiri legate de cea mai importantă familie politică a românilor, familia Brătianu și de cel mai important membru al ei, fostul prim ministru și președinte al partidului, Ion I. C. Brătianu.

Am încheiat ziua cu o scurtă slujbă de pomenire oficiată de preotul de la biserica familiei, aflată în imediata vecinătate a vilei.


Sondaj preelectoral alegeri Republica Moldova

Sondajul a fost efectuat de Asociatia Sociologilor si Demografilor din Moldova (ASDM) in perioda 11-20 noiembrie, pe un esantion de 1.593 repondenti, cu o eroare maximala de +/- 2,6%. In paranteza sunt afisate rezultatele scrutinului din iulie 2009.

Alegeri parlamentare

Partidul Comunistilor din Republica Moldova PCRM 32,1% (07/2009: 44,69%)

Partidul Liberal Democrat din Moldova PLDM 22,1% (07/2009: 16,57%)

Partidul Democrat din Moldova PDM 12,1% (07/2009: 12,54%)

Partidul Liberal PL 10,9% (07/2009: 14,68%)

Alianta Moldova Noastra AMN 7% (07/2009: 7,35%)

Sursa informationala:

Citeste la Dreapta!


Interviul Zilei la BBC cu Ion Diaconescu, presedinte de onoare al PNTCD

Romania analizata de George Friedman (

In school, many of us learned the poem Invictus. It concludes with the line, “I am the master of my fate, I am the captain of my soul.” This is a line that a Victorian gentleman might bequeath to an American businessman. It is not a line that resonates in Romania. Nothing in their history tells Romanians that they rule their fate or dominate their soul. Everything in their history is a lesson in how fate masters them or how their very soul is a captive of history. As a nation, Romanians have modest hopes and expectations tempered by their past.

This sensibility is not alien to me. My parents survived the Nazi death camps, returned to Hungary to try to rebuild their lives and then found themselves fleeing the communists. When they arrived in America, their wishes were extraordinarily modest, as I look back on it. They wanted to be safe, to get up in the morning, to go to work, to get paid — to live. They were never under the impression that they were the masters of their fate.

The problem that Romania has is that the world cares about it. More precisely, empires collide where Romania is. The last iteration was the Cold War. Today, at the moment, things seem easier, or at least less desperate, than before. Still, as I discussed in Borderlands, the great powers are sorting themselves out again and therefore Romania is becoming more important to others. It is not clear to me that the Romanians fully appreciate the shift in the geopolitical winds. They think they can hide in Europe, and perhaps they can. But I suspect that history is reaching for Romania again.

Geopolitics and Self-Mutilation

Begin with geography. The Carpathian Mountains define Romania, but in an odd way. Rather than serving as the border of the country, protecting it, the Carpathians are an arc that divides the country into three parts. To the south of the mountains is the Wallachian Plain, the heart of contemporary Romania, where its capital, Bucharest, and its old oil center, Ploesti, are located. In the east of the Carpathians is the Moldavian Plain. To the northwest of the Carpathians is Transylvania, more rugged, hilly country.

And this is the geopolitical tragedy of Romania. Romania is one nation divided by its geography. None of the three parts is easy to defend. Transylvania came under Hungarian rule in the 11th century, and Hungary came under Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian rule. Wallachia came under Ottoman rule, and Moldavia came under Ottoman and Russian rule. About the only time before the late 19th century that Romania was united was when it was completely conquered. And the only time it was completely conquered was when some empire wanted to secure the Carpathians to defend itself.

Some of us experience geopolitics as an opportunity. Most of humanity experiences it as a catastrophe. Romania has been a nation for a long time, but rarely has it been a united nation-state. After becoming a nation-state in the late 19th century, it had a precarious existence, balanced between Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Russia, with Germany a more distant but powerful reality. Romania spent the inter-war years trying to find its balance between monarchy, authoritarianism and fascism, and it never quite found it. It sought safety in an alliance with Hitler and found itself on the front lines in the German invasion of Russia. To understand Romania as an ally one must bear this in mind: When the Soviets began their great counterattack at Stalingrad, they launched it over Romanian (and Hungarian) troops. Romanians maneuvered themselves into the position of fighting and dying for the Germans, and then got their revenge on the Germans by being slaughtered by the Soviets.

All of this led to Romania’s occupation by the Soviets, toward whom the Romanians developed a unique strategy. The Hungarians rose up against the Soviets and were crushed, and the Czechoslovaks tried to create a liberal communist regime that was still loyal to the Soviets and were crushed. The Romanians actually achieved a degree of autonomy from the Soviets in foreign affairs. The way the Romanians got the Soviets to tolerate this was by building a regime more rigid and oppressive than even that of the Soviet Union at the time. The Soviets knew NATO wasn’t going to invade, let alone invade through Romania. So long as the Romanian regime kept the people in line, the Russians could tolerate their maneuvers. Romania retained its national identity and an independent foreign policy but at a stunning price in personal freedom and economic well-being.

Contemporary Romania cannot be understood without understanding Nicolae Ceausescu. He called himself the “Genius of the Carpathians.” He may well have been, but if so, the Carpathian definition of genius is idiosyncratic. The Romanian communist government was built around communists who had remained in Romania during World War II, in prison or in hiding. This was unique among the Soviet Union’s Eastern European satellites. Stalin didn’t trust communists who stayed home and resisted. He preferred communists who had fled to Moscow in the 1930s and had proved themselves loyal to Stalin by their betrayal of others. He sent Moscow communists to rule the rest of the newly occupied countries that buffered Russia from the West. Not so in Romania, where native communists ruled. After the death of the founder of communist Romania, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, another Romanian communist who stayed in Romania ultimately took over: Ceausescu. This was a peculiarity of Romanian communism that made it more like Josip Broz Tito’s Yugoslavia in foreign policy, and more like a bad dream in domestic policy.

Ceausescu decided to pay off the national debt. His reason seemed to flow from his foreign policy — he didn’t want Romania to be trapped by any country because of its debt — and he repaid it by selling to other countries nearly everything that was produced in Romania. This left Romania in staggering poverty; electricity and heat were occasional things, and even food was scarce in a country that had a lot of it. The Securitate, a domestic secret police whose efficiency and brutality were impressive, suppressed unrest. Nothing in Romania worked as well as the Securitate.

Herta Muller is a Romanian author who writes in German (she is part of Romania’s ethnic German community) and who won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2009. One of her books, The Appointment, takes place in Romania under the communists. It gives an extraordinary sense of a place ruled by the Securitate. It is about a woman who is living her life, working at her job and dealing with an alcoholic husband while constantly preparing for and living in dread of appointments with the secret police. As in Kafka, what they are looking for and what she is hiding are unclear. But the danger is unrelenting and permeates her entire consciousness. When one reads this book, as I did in preparing for this trip, one understands the way in which the Securitate tore apart a citizen’s soul — and remembers that it was not a distant relic of the 1930s but was still in place and sustaining the Romanian regime in 1989.

It was as if the price that Romania had to pay for autonomy was to punch itself in the face continually. Even the fall of communism took a Romanian path. There was no Velvet Revolution here but a bloody one, where the Securitate resisted the anti-communist rising under circumstances and details that are still hotly debated and unclear. In the end, the Ceausescus (Nicolae’s wife Elena was also a piece of work, requiring a psychological genius to unravel) were executed and the Securitate blended into civil society as part of the organized-crime network that was mistaken for liberalization in the former Soviet empire by Western academics and reporters at the time.

Romania emerged from the previous 70 years of ongoing catastrophe by dreaming of simple things and having no illusions that these things were easy to come by or things Romanians could control. As with much of Eastern Europe but perhaps with a greater intensity, Romanians believed their redemption lay with the West’s multilateral organizations. If they were permitted to join NATO and especially the European Union, their national security needs would be taken care of along with their economic needs. Romanians yearned to become European simply because being Romanian was too dangerous.

The Redemption of Being European

In thinking of Romania, the phrase “institutionalized prisoner” comes to mind. In the United States it is said that if someone stays in prison long enough, he becomes “institutionalized,” someone who can no longer imagine functioning outside a world where someone else always tells him what to do. For Romania, national sovereignty has always been experienced as the process of accommodating itself to more powerful nations and empires. So after 1991, Romania searched for the “someone else” to which it could subordinate itself. More to the point, Romania imbued these entities with extraordinary redemptive powers. Once in NATO and the European Union, all would be well.

And until recently, all has been well, or well in terms of the modest needs of a historical victim. The problem Romania has is that these sanctuaries are in many ways illusions. It looks to NATO for defense, but NATO is a hollowed-out entity. There is a new and ambitious NATO strategy, which sets a global agenda for the organization. Long discussed, it is an exercise in meaninglessness. Countries like Germany have no military with which to fulfill the strategy, assuming that any agreement to act could be reached. NATO is a consensual organization, and a single member can block any mission. The divergent interests of an expanded NATO guarantee that someone will block everything. NATO is an illusion that comforts the Romanians, but only if they don’t look carefully. The Romanians seem to prefer the comforting illusion.

As for the European Union, there is a deep structural tension in the system. The main European economic power is Germany. It is also the world’s second-largest exporter. Its economy is built around exporting. For a country like Romania, economic development requires that it take advantage of its wage advantage. Lower wages allow developing countries to develop their economy through exports. But Europe is dominated by an export superpower. Unlike the postwar world, where the United States absorbed the imports of Germany and Japan without needing to compete with them, Germany remains an exporting country exporting into Romania and leaving precious little room for Romania to develop its economy.

At this stage of its development, Romania should be running a trade surplus, particularly with Germany, but it is not. In 2007, it exported about $40 billion worth of goods and imported about $70 billion. In 2009, it exported the same $40 billion but cut imports to only $54 billion (still a negative). Forty percent of its trade is with Germany, France and Italy, its major EU partners. But it is Germany where the major problem is. And this problem is compounded by the fact that a good part of Romania’s exports to Germany are from German-owned firms operating in Romania.

During the period of relative prosperity in Europe from 1991 to 2008, the structural reality of the EU was hidden under a rising tide. In 2008 the tide went out, revealing the structural reality. It is not clear when the tide of prosperity will come rolling back in. In the meantime, while the German economy is growing again, Romania’s is not. Because it exists in a system where the main engine is an exporter, and the exporter dominates the process of setting rules, it is difficult to see how Romania can take advantage of its greatest asset — a skilled workforce prepared to work for lower wages.

Add to this the regulatory question. Romania is a developing country. Europe’s regulations are drawn with a focus on the highly developed countries. The laws on employment guarantees mean that Europeans don’t hire workers, they adopt them. That means that entrepreneurship is difficult. Being an entrepreneur, as I well know, means making mistakes and recovering from them fast. Given the guarantees that every worker has in Europe, an entrepreneur cannot quickly recover from his mistakes. In Romania, the agility needed for risk-taking is not readily available under EU rules drawn up for a mature economy.

Romania should be a country of small entrepreneurs, and it is, but there is extensive evasion of Brussels’ — and Bucharest’s — regulations. It is a gray market that creates legal jeopardy and therefore corruption in the sector that Romania needs the most. Imagine if Germany had the regulations it champions today in 1955. Could it possibly have developed into what it is in 2010? There may be a time for these regulations (and that is debatable), but for Romania it is not now.

I met a Romanian entrepreneur who marketed industrial products. In talking to him, I raised the question of the various regulations governing his industry and how he handled them. There was no clear answer or, more precisely, I didn’t realize the answer he had given me until later. There are regulations and there are relationships. The latter mitigate the former. In Germany this might be called corruption. In Romania it is survival. A Romanian entrepreneur rigorously following EU regulations would rapidly go out of business. It may be that Romania is corrupt, but the regulatory structure of the EU imposed on a developing economy makes evasion the only rational strategy. And yet the entrepreneur I talked to was a champion of the European Union. He too hoped for the time when he could be a normal European. As Rousseau said, “I have seen these contradictions and they have not rebuffed me.”

It is difficult to for an outsider to see the specific benefits of NATO and EU membership for Romania. But for the Romanians, membership goes beyond the specifics.

Romania’s Choice

August and September are bad months in Europe. It is when wars and crises strike. August and September 2008 were bad months. That August, Russia struck Georgia. In September, the financial crisis burst wide open. In the first, Russia delivered a message to the region: This is what American guarantees are worth. In the European handling of the financial crisis in Eastern Europe, the Germans delivered a message on the limits of German responsibility. Both NATO and the European Union went from being guarantors of Romanian interests to being enormous question marks.

In my conversations with Romanians, at all levels and almost universally, I have found the same answer. First, there is no doubt that NATO and the European Union did not work in Romania’s favor at the moment. Second, there is no question of rethinking Romania’s commitment to either. There are those Romanians, particularly on the far right, who dislike the European Union in particular, but Romania has no strategic alternative.

As for the vast majority, they cannot and will not conceive of a Romania outside the confines of NATO and the European Union. The mere fact that neither is working well for Romania does not mean that they do not do something important: NATO and the European Union keep the anti-democratic demons of the Romanian soul at bay. Being part of Europe is not simply a matter of strategic or economic benefits. It represents a transitional point in Romanian history. With membership in the European Union and NATO, Romania has affirmed its modernity and its democratic institutions. These twin amulets have redeemed Romania’s soul. Given this, I suppose, an unfavorable trade balance and the absence of genuine security guarantees is a small price to pay. I am not Romanian, so I can’t feel their ineffable belief in Brussels.

Romanians do acknowledge, again almost universally, the return of Russia to the historical stage, and it worries them. Of particular concern is Moldova, a region to the east that was historically Romanian, taken by the Soviets in a treaty with Hitler and the rest of which was seized after World War II. Moldova became an independent country in 1991 (a country I will be visiting next). For much of the post-Cold War period it had a communist government that fell a few years ago. An election will be held on Nov. 28, and it appears that the communists might return. The feeling is that if the communists return this time, the Russians will return with them and, in the coming years, Russian troops will be on Romania’s borders.

Romanian officials are actively engaged in discussions with NATO officials about the Russians, but the Germans want a more active involvement of Russia in NATO and not tension between NATO and Russia. The Western Europeans are not about to be drawn into Eastern European paranoia fed by nostalgic American strategists wanting to relive the Cold War, as they think of it.

I raised two strategic alternatives with Romanian officials and the media. One was the Intermarium — an alliance, perhaps in NATO, perhaps not — of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. (To readers who asked why I did not go to Bulgaria on this trip, it was simply a matter of time. I will go there as soon as I can.) Very interestingly, one official pointed out substantial levels of cooperation on military planning between Hungary and Romania and discussions between Romania and Poland. How serious this is and whether it will go beyond the NATO context is unclear to me. Perhaps I can get a better sense in Warsaw.

But military planning is one thing; the wherewithal to execute military plans is quite another. The Romanians are now caught in a crisis over buying fighter planes. There are three choices: the Swedish Gripen, the Eurofighter and used American F-16s. The problem is that the Romanians don’t have the money for any of these aircraft, nor does it seem to me that these are the defense measures they really need. The Americans can provide air cover in a number of ways, and while 24 F-16s would have value, they would not solve Romania’s most pressing military problem. From where I sit, creating an effective mobile force to secure their eastern frontier is what is needed. The alternative I’ve heard was buying naval vessels to block a very real Russian naval buildup in the Black Sea. But if Romania has trouble buying 24 fighters, naval vessels are out of the question.

The Romanians are approaching defense planning from a NATO perspective — one used for planning, not implementation, and one that always leads to sophisticated systems while leaving the basics uncovered. This may seem like an unnecessary level of detail for this essay, but the Romanians are deep in this discussion, and questions like this are the critical details of strategies growing out of geopolitics. It is the difference between planning papers drawn up by think tanks and the ability to defend a nation.

The Black Sea is a critical part of Romania’s reality, and the rise of Turkey makes the system of relationships interesting. Turkey is Romania’s fourth largest export target, and one of the few major trading partners that imports more from Romania than it exports. I pointed out to Romanians that it is the great good fortune of Turkey that it was not admitted to the European Union. Turkey’s economy grew by an annualized rate of 12 percent in the first quarter of 2010 and has been surging for years.

Turkey is becoming a regional economic engine and, unlike Germany, France and Italy, it offers compatibilities and synergies for Romania. In addition, Turkey is a serious military force and, while not seeking confrontation with Russia, it is not subservient to it. Turkey has adopted a “360 degree” strategy of engagement with all countries. And since Turkey is a NATO member, as are Hungary, Slovakia and Poland, there is no incompatibility with a dual strategy of the Intermarium and the Black Sea. For now, they fit. And the irony of Romania reaching out to the heir to the Ottomans is simply that and no more. This is the neighborhood that Romania inhabits. These are the options it has.

What doesn’t fit for Romania is the NATO/EU system alone. Perhaps this is part of a rational mix, but it cannot be all of it. For Romania, the problem is to move beyond the psychological comfort of Europe to a strategic and economic understanding that accepts that the post-Cold War world is over. More important, it would be a move toward accepting that Romania is free, responsible for its future and capable of managing it.

It is this last step that is the hardest for Romania and many of the former Soviet satellites — which were also bound up with World War I and Hitler’s disaster — to come to terms with. There is a connection between buying more expensive German cars than you can afford, and more of them than you need, and the novels of Herta Muller. The appointment can be permanently cancelled, but the fear of the interrogation is always with you. In this region, the fear of the past dominates and oppresses while the confident, American-style military planning and economic restructuring I suggested is alien and frightening.

The Romanians emerged from a world of horror, some of it of their own making. They fear themselves perhaps more than they fear others. For them, becoming European is both a form of therapy and something that will restrain the demons within and without. When you live with bad memories, you live with the shadows of reality. For the Romanians, illusory solutions to haunting memories make a great deal of sense.

It makes sense until war comes, and in this part of the world, the coming of war has been the one certainty since before the Romans. It is only a question of when, with whom and what your own fate will be when it arrives. The Romanians believe with religious fervor that these things will be left behind if they become part of Europe. I am more skeptical. I had thought that Romania’s problem was that it was part of Europe, a weak power surrounded by stronger ones. They seem to believe that their solution is to be part of Europe, a weak power surrounded by stronger ones.

I leave Romania confused. The Romanians hear things that I am deaf to. It is even at a pitch my Hungarian part can’t hear. I leave now for another nation, Moldova, which has been even more exposed to history, one even stranger and more brutal than Romania’s.

Memoria istoriei: „Brasov, 15 noiembrie 1987”

15 noiembrie 1987 NU se uită!

Liga Suporterilor Stegari şi grupul de acţiune Noii Golani, împreună cu Asociaţia 15 Noiembrie 1987 şi PRIME Braşov, aniversează marţi, 15 noiembrie, 24 de ani de la revolta anticomunistă din 15 noiembrie 1987.

Evenimentele dedicate acestei zile vor începe la ora 17.30 în Centrul Civic (zona parcului), de unde cei prezenţi vor reface o parte din traseul muncitorilor din ’87.

De la ora 19.00, în Rockstadt, va fi o proiecţie a documentarului “Memorialul Durerii – Totul despre 15 Noiembrie 1987”. Invitaţi vor fi şi membri ai Asociaţiei 15 Noiembrie 1987.

Vă aşteptăm pe toţi cei care doriţi să cunoaşteţi mai multe, să vă arătaţi susţinerea şi respectul pentru cei care au avut curajul să strige pentru prima dată “Jos comunismul!”.

15 noiembrie 1987 NU SE UITĂ

Text + foto + afis+ sursa informationala:  Liga Suporterilor Stegari

Braşov, 15 noiembrie 1987

Autor: Paul Sorin Tita

Era într-o duminică. Mă mutasem de curând în alt cartier şi încă nu prea aveam prieteni printre vecinii de bloc sau colegii de şcoală. Aşa se făcea că, de fiecare dată când aveam timp liber şi nu avea cine să mă supravegheze, mergeam în cartierul în care locuisem anterior sau prin centrul oraşului, unde mama mea lucra ca vânzătoare la un magazin pe Republicii, Tineretului, parcă…

În duminica aceea părinţii mei erau amândoi la serviciu şi, fiind singur acasă, am hotărât să plec în centrul oraşului şi să trec pe la mama. Cred că am prins ultimul troleibuz spre centrul oraşului. Când am ajuns la Modarom, troleibuzul abia a putut trece pe lângă mulţimea adunată acolo. Am coborât la staţia următoare şi, curios ca orice copil, m-am întors la Modarom.

Ştiam că în acea duminică erau alegeri, dar nici măcar asta nu justifica pentru mine prezenţa atât de multor oameni în acelaşi loc. Când m-am apropiat, am înţeles: „Vrem lapte, unt, ouă, …”, „Ne mor copiii de foame”. Nu ştiu cum, când şi de ce a început totul, deşi, acum, o vagă bănuială am, însă pentru mine aşa a început. Deşi mergeam şi eu cu bunicul meu, cu noaptea în cap, să stau la coadă pentru a cumpăra carne (bineînţeles cu os şi „garnitură” de legume), nu pot să spun că muream de foame, dar nici nu aveam frigiderul plin cum îl am acum.

Era duminică şi parcă miliţienii plecaseră la iarbă verde. Nici picior de ei. La cealaltă clădire, de la parc, lumea spărsese deja geamuri, aruncase pe geam scaune şi telefoane care făceau bucuria copiilor în căutare de galene. Erau şi copii pe acolo, dar tot ce îi interesa erau galenele, să strângă cât mai multe. Au început să iasă din clădire muncitori extaziaţi de descoperirea unor „rezerve” de caşcaval şi Pepsi în clădirea Judeţenei de Partid (parcă aşa se numea). Mai erau şi nişte oameni îmbrăcaţi în hanorace crem, care numai muncitori nu păreau şi care încercau să calmeze spiritele spunându-le fericiţilor descoperitori ai trofeelor culinare că „noi nu de asta am venit aici”. Oare ei de ce nu se bucurau? Aş vrea să ştiu, măcar astăzi, cine erau şi de ce veniseră, pentru că îmi mirosea atunci şi îmi miroase şi acum (acum cu atât mai mult, după experienţa „evenimentelor” din decembrie, de la Târgu-Mureş şi mineriade) a ceva experiment scăpat de sub control. Iar când oamenii au văzut că nu vine nimeni să le dea peste nas pentru că au cerut lapte, pâine, ouă, etc., s-au gândit să ceară mai mult: „Jos Ceauşescu!” şi, ceva mai târziu, „Jos comunismul!”, ba chiar s-au gândit să scrie unul dintre sloganuri pe una din clădirile asediate şi să dea foc portretului lui Ceauşescu şi unuia dintre steagurile PCR agăţate pe clădire cu ocazia alegerilor.

Era într-o duminică şi miliţienii s-au întors toţi de la iarbă verde, cu bastoane şi tot ce le trebuia, ba chiar şi cu gaze lacrimogene. Aşa că nu mai era de stat şi am avut inspiraţia să plec înainte de începutul sfârşitului. M-am dus până în Piaţa 23 August, am stat puţin, după care am hotărât să mă întorc să văd ce se întâmplă. Cei care au ajuns până pe Republicii fugeau în zigzag, ameţiţi de gazele lacrimogene, iar puţinii trecători îi certau părinteşte pentru îndrăzneala avută. Nu era chip să merg pe Republicii înspre Modarom, aşa că m-am dus pe ocolite pe la Cinema Popular şi Aro Palace. Când am ajuns totul se terminase. Curiozitatea m-a împins, din nou, înainte. Doar cioburile, sângele, scaunele rupte şi o dâră neagră de fum ce se ridica din una dintre clădiri mai aminteau de ce fusese acolo.

Acum era într-adevăr duminică. Totul era pustiu. Niciun trecător nu admira priveliştea şi asta mulţumită unei maşini blindate care se plimba încoace şi încolo şi care era cât pe ce să mă calce şi pe mine dacă nu mă urcam pe un zid de beton. A stat puţin, să vadă ce fac, după care a abandonat; eram prea mic şi nu aveam ce şi cui să povestesc. Maşina aceea, atunci, pentru mine, avea voinţa ei. Nu m-am gândit niciodată că mâinile de pe volan ar fi fost conduse la rândul lor de un creier. Nu cred asta nici astăzi.

A doua zi era luni. Am trecut prin centru să văd cum arăta totul la o zi după. Totul era ca nou. Un muncitor trăgea o ultimă pensulă de vopsea peste clădirea parcă recent construită.

Memoria istoriei: Alegerile parlamentare din 19 noiembrie 1946

19 noiembrie – alegerile parlamentare. Se semnalează grave incidente şi ilegalităţi: furturi de urne şi voturi, ocuparea localurilor de vot, atacarea candidaţilor opoziţiei, maltratarea oficialităţilor şi a forţelor de ordine, împiedicarea simpatizanţilor opoziţiei să-şi exercite dreptul la vot, crime etc. Protestele P.N.L. şi P.N.Ţ. din zilele următoare n-au nici un efect.

Comuniştii îi acuzau pe cei din PNŢ că sunt responsabili de scumpirea pâinii

Foto: barlogulpntcd

Pe străzile Bucureştiului în aprilie 1946 se dădea o luptă aprigă pentru inscripţii pe pereţi şi trotuare. Comuniştii îi acuzau pe cei din PNŢ că sunt responsabili de scumpirea pâinii, ţărănistii se străduiau să îşi declare susţinerea faţă de rege – însă inscripţiile lor erau sistematic şterse de comunişti, pentru ca în spaţiul public să nu mai existe nimic care să amintească de existenta PNŢ.

Sursa: Barlogul PNTCD

Rezultatele alegerilor din 19 noiembrie 1946:

Partidul National Taranesc 60%
Partidul National Liberal 18%
Blocul Partidelor Democrate BPD 11,80%
Uniunea Populara Maghiara 8,20%
Partidul Socialdemocrat Independent 2%

Rezultatele falsificate remise de catre autoritatiile comuniste:

Blocul Partidelor Democrate BPD 68,70%
Partidul National Taranesc 12,70%
Uniunea Populara Maghiara 8,20%
Partidul National Liberal 3,70%
Partidul Democrat Taranesc – Lupu 2,30%
Partidul Social-Democrat Independent 1,90%
7 candidati Independenti 4,40%

Sursa informationala: Dinu G. Giurescu: „Falsificatorii. Alegerile din 1946”, Editura RAO, 2007.

Analize si rezultate comparative Romania 1946 – Ungaria 1945-2010

Alegerile parlamentare din Ungaria din 4 noiembrie 1945

Partidul Miciilor Proprietari si Intreprinzatori FKgP 57,13%

Partidul Socialdemocrat Ungar 17,41%

Partidul Comunist Ungar 19,46%

Partidul National Taranesc Ungar 6,87%

Partidul Civic Democrat 1,62%

Partidul Radical Ungar 0,12%

Alegerile parlamentare din Ungaria din 31 august 1947

Partidul Comunist Ungar 22,25%

Partidul Popular Democrat 16,50%

Partidul Miciilor Proprietari si Intreprinzatori FKgP 15,34%

Partidul Socialdemocrat Ungar 14,68%

Partidul Independent 13,43%

Partidul National Taranesc Ungar 8,28%

Partidul Democrat Ungar Independent 5,28%

Partidul Radical Ungar 1,71%

Liga Crestina a Femeilor 1,39%

Partidul Civic Democrat 1%

Alegerile parlamentare din Ungaria din 15 mai 1949

Frontul Popular Independent din Ungaria 95,60%

Voturi impotriva 2,88%

Voturi nule 1,52%

Alegerile parlamentare din Ungaria din 25 martie/9 aprilie 1990

Forumul Democrat Ungar MDF 42,49%

Alianta Democrat Liberala SZDSZ 24,09%

Partidul Miciilor Proprietari si Intreprinzatori FKgP 11,40%

Partidul Socialist Ungar MSZP 8,55%

Partidul Popular Crestindemocrat KDNP  5,44%

Partidul Tinerilor Democrati FIDESZ 5,44%

Alegerile parlamentare din Ungaria din 11/25 aprilie 2010

Alianta Partidul Civic Ungar FIDESZ-Partidul Popular Crestindemocrat KDNP 68,13%

Partidul Socialist Ungar MSZP 15,28%

Partidul Jobbik 12,18%

Miscarea „O Noua Politica” 12,18%

1 candidat Independent 0,26%


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