Stratfor.com: „The Divided States of Europe”

Text+analiza+grafica+sursa informationala: Stratfor.com

Autor: Marco Papic

Europe continues to be engulfed by economic crisis.  The global focus returns to Athens on June 28 as Greek parliamentarians debate austerity measures imposed on them by eurozone partners. If the Greeks vote down these measures, Athens will not receive its second bailout, which could create an even worse crisis in Europe and the world.

It is important to understand that the crisis is not fundamentally about Greece or even about the indebtedness of the entire currency bloc. After all, Greece represents only 2.5 percent of the eurozone’s gross domestic product (GDP), and the bloc’s fiscal numbers are not that bad when looked at in the aggregate. Its overall deficit and debt figures are in a better shape than those of the United States — the U.S. budget deficit stood at 10.6 percent of GDP in 2010, compared to 6.4 percent for the European Union — yet the focus continues to be on Europe.

That is because the real crisis is the more fundamental question of how the European continent is to be ruled in the 21st century. Europe has emerged from its subservience during the Cold War, when it was the geopolitical chessboard for the Soviet Union and the United States. It won its independence by default as the superpowers retreated: Russia withdrawing to its Soviet sphere of influence and the United States switching its focus to the Middle East after 9/11. Since the 1990s, Europe has dabbled with institutional reform but has left the fundamental question of political integration off the table, even as it integrated economically. This is ultimately the source of the current sovereign debt crisis, the lack of political oversight over economic integration gone wrong.

The eurozone’s economic crisis brought this question of Europe’s political fate into focus, but it is a recurring issue. Roughly every 100 years, Europe confronts this dilemma. The Continent suffers from overpopulation — of nations, not people. Europe has the largest concentration of independent nation-states per square foot than any other continent. While Africa is larger and has more countries, no continent has as many rich and relatively powerful countries as Europe does. This is because, geographically, the Continent is riddled with features that prevent the formation of a single political entity. Mountain ranges, peninsulas and islands limit the ability of large powers to dominate or conquer the smaller ones. No single river forms a unifying river valley that can dominate the rest of the Continent. The Danube comes close, but it drains into the practically landlocked Black Sea, the only exit from which is another practically landlocked sea, the Mediterranean. This limits Europe’s ability to produce an independent entity capable of global power projection.

However, Europe does have plenty of rivers, convenient transportation routes and well-sheltered harbors. This allows for capital generation at a number of points on the Continent, such as Vienna, Paris, London, Frankfurt, Rotterdam, Milan, Turin and Hamburg. Thus, while large armies have trouble physically pushing through the Continent and subverting various nations under one rule, ideas, capital, goods and services do not. This makes Europe rich (the Continent has at least the equivalent GDP of the United States, and it could be larger depending how one calculates it).

What makes Europe rich, however, also makes it fragmented. The current political and security architectures of Europe — the EU and NATO — were encouraged by the United States in order to unify the Continent so that it could present a somewhat united front against the Soviet Union. They did not grow organically out of the Continent. This is a problem because Moscow is no longer a threat for all European countries, Germany and France see Russia as a business partner and European states are facing their first true challenge to Continental governance, with fragmentation and suspicion returning in full force. Closer unification and the creation of some sort of United States of Europe seems like the obvious solution to the problems posed by the eurozone sovereign debt crisis — although the eurozone’s problems are many and not easily solved just by integration, and Europe’s geography and history favor fragmentation.

Confederation of Europe

The European Union is a confederation of states that outsources day-to-day management of many policy spheres to a bureaucratic arm (the European Commission) and monetary policy to the European Central Bank. The important policy issues, such as defense, foreign policy and taxation, remain the sole prerogatives of the states. The states still meet in various formats to deal with these problems. Solutions to the Greek, Irish and Portuguese fiscal problems are agreed upon by all eurozone states on an ad hoc basis, as is participation in the Libyan military campaign within the context of the European Union. Every important decision requires that the states meet and reach a mutually acceptable solution, often producing non-optimal outcomes that are products of compromise.

The best analogy for the contemporary European Union is found not in European history but in American history. This is the period between the successful Revolutionary War in 1783 and the ratification of the U.S. Constitution in 1788. Within that five-year period, the United States was governed by a set of laws drawn up in the Articles of the Confederation. The country had no executive, no government, no real army and no foreign policy. States retained their own armies and many had minor coastal navies. They conducted foreign and trade policy independent of the wishes of the Continental Congress, a supranational body that had less power than even the European Parliament of today (this despite Article VI of the Articles of Confederation, which stipulated that states would not be able to conduct independent foreign policy without the consent of Congress). Congress was supposed to raise funds from the states to fund such things as a Continental Army, pay benefits to the veterans of the Revolutionary War and pay back loans that European powers gave Americans during the war against the British. States, however, refused to give Congress money, and there was nothing anybody could do about it. Congress was forced to print money, causing the Confederation’s currency to become worthless.

With such a loose confederation set-up, the costs of the Revolutionary War were ultimately unbearable for the fledgling nation. The reality of the international system, which pitted the new nation against aggressive European powers looking to subvert America’s independence, soon engulfed the ideals of states’ independence and limited government. Social, economic and security burdens proved too great for individual states to contain and a powerless Congress to address.

Nothing brought this reality home more than a rebellion in Western Massachusetts led by Daniel Shays in 1787. Shays’ Rebellion was, at its heart, an economic crisis. Burdened by European lenders calling for repayment of America’s war debt, the states’ economies collapsed and with them the livelihoods of many rural farmers, many of whom were veterans of the Revolutionary War who had been promised benefits. Austerity measures — often in the form of land confiscation — were imposed on the rural poor to pay off the European creditors. Shays’ Rebellion was put down without the help of the Continental Congress essentially by a local Massachusetts militia acting without any real federal oversight. The rebellion was defeated, but America’s impotence was apparent for all to see, both foreign and domestic.

An economic crisis, domestic insecurity and constant fear of a British counterattack — Britain had not demobilized forts it held on the U.S. side of the Great Lakes — impressed upon the independent-minded states that a “more perfect union” was necessary. Thus the United States of America, as we know it today, was formed. States gave up their rights to conduct foreign policy, to set trade policies independent of each other and to withhold funds from the federal government. The United States set up an executive branch with powers to wage war and conduct foreign policy, as well as a legislature that could no longer be ignored. In 1794, the government’s response to the so-called Whiskey Rebellion in western Pennsylvania showed the strength of the federal arrangement, in stark contrast to the Continental Congress’ handling of Shays’ Rebellion. Washington dispatched an army of more than 10,000 men to suppress a few hundred distillers refusing to pay a new whiskey tax to fund the national debt, thereby sending a clear message of the new government’s overwhelming fiscal, political and military power.

When examining the evolution of the American Confederation into the United States of America, one can find many parallels with the European Union, among others a weak center, independent states, economic crisis and over-indebtedness. The most substantial difference between the United States in the late 18th century and Europe in the 21st century is the level of external threat. In 1787, Shays’ Rebellion impressed upon many Americans — particularly George Washington, who was irked by the crisis — just how weak the country was. If a band of farmers could threaten one of the strongest states in the union, what would the British forces still garrisoned on American soil and in Quebec to the north be able to do? States could independently muddle through the economic crisis, but they could not prevent a British counterattack or protect their merchant fleet against Barbary pirates. America could not survive another such mishap and such a wanton display of military and political impotence.

To America’s advantage, the states all shared similar geography as well as similar culture and language. Although they had different economic policies and interests, all of them ultimately depended upon seaborne Atlantic trade. The threat that such trade would be choked off by a superior naval force — or even by North African pirates — was a clear and present danger. The threat of British counterattack from the north may not have been an existential threat to the southern states, but they realized that if New York, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania were lost, the South might preserve some nominal independence but would quickly revert to de facto colonial status.

In Europe, there is no such clarity of what constitutes a threat. Even though there is a general sense — at least among the governing elites — that Europeans share economic interests, it is very clear that their security interests are not complementary. There is no agreed-upon perception of an external threat. For Central European states that only recently became European Union and NATO members, Russia still poses a threat. They have asked NATO (and even the European Union) to refocus on the European continent and for the alliance to reassure them of its commitment to their security. In return, they have seen France selling advanced helicopter carriers to Russia and Germany building an advanced military training center in Russia.

The Regionalization of Europe

The eurozone crisis — which is engulfing EU member states using the euro but is symbolically important for the entire European Union — is therefore a crisis of trust. Do the current political and security arrangements in Europe — the European Union and NATO — capture the right mix of nation-state interests? Do the member states of those organizations truly feel that they share the same fundamental fate? Are they willing, as the American colonies were at the end of the 18th century, to give up their independence in order to create a common front against political, economic and security concerns? And if the answer to these questions is no, then what are the alternative arrangements that do capture complementary nation-state interests?

On the security front, we already have our answer: the regionalization of European security organizations. NATO has ceased to effectively respond to the national security interests of European states. Germany and France have pursued an accommodationist attitude toward Russia, to the chagrin of the Baltic States and Central Europe. As a response, these Central European states have begun to arrange alternatives. The four Central European states that make up the regional Visegrad Group — Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary — have used the forum as the mold in which to create a Central European battle group. Baltic States, threatened by Russia’s general resurgence, have looked to expand military and security cooperation with the Nordic countries, with Lithuania set to join the Nordic Battlegroup, of which Estonia is already a member. France and the United Kingdom have decided to enhance cooperation with an expansive military agreement at the end of 2010, and London has also expressed an interest in becoming close to the developing Baltic-Nordic cooperative military ventures.

Regionalization is currently most evident in security matters, but it is only a matter of time before it begins to manifest itself in political and economic matters as well. For example, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has been forthcoming about wanting Poland and the Czech Republic to speed up their efforts to enter the eurozone. Recently, both indicated that they had cooled on the idea of eurozone entry. The decision, of course, has a lot to do with the euro being in a state of crisis, but we cannot underestimate the underlying sense in Warsaw that Berlin is not committed to Poland’s security. Central Europeans may not currently be in the eurozone (save for Estonia, Slovenia and Slovakia), but the future of the eurozone is intertwined in its appeal to the rest of Europe as both an economic and political bloc. All EU member states are contractually obligated to enter the eurozone (save for Denmark and the United Kingdom, which negotiated opt-outs). From Germany’s perspective, membership of the Czech Republic and Poland is more important than that of peripheral Europe. Germany’s trade with Poland and the Czech Republic alone is greater than its trade with Spain, Greece, Ireland and Portugal combined.

The security regionalization of Europe is not a good sign for the future of the eurozone. A monetary union cannot be grafted onto security disunion, especially if the solution to the eurozone crisis becomes more integration. Warsaw is not going to give Berlin veto power over its budget spending if the two are not in agreement over what constitutes a security threat. This argument may seem simple, and it is cogent precisely because it is. Taxation is one of the most basic forms of state sovereignty, and one does not share it with countries that do not share one’s political, economic and security fate.

This goes for any country, not just Poland. If the solution to the eurozone crisis is greater integration, then the interests of the integrating states have to be closely aligned on more than just economic matters. The U.S. example from the late 18th century is particularly instructive, as one could make a cogent argument that American states had more divergent economic interests than European states do today, and yet their security concerns brought them together. In fact, the moment the external threat diminished in the mid-19th century due to Europe’s exhaustion from the Napoleonic Wars, American unity was shaken by the Civil War. America’s economic and cultural bifurcation, which existed even during the Revolutionary War, erupted in conflagration the moment the external threat was removed.

The bottom line is that Europeans have to agree on more than just a 3 percent budget-deficit threshold as the foundation for closer integration. Control over budgets goes to the very heart of sovereignty, and European nations will not give up that control unless they know their security and political interests will be taken seriously by their neighbors.

Europe’s Spheres of Influence

We therefore see Europe evolving into a set of regionalized groupings. These organizations may have different ideas about security and economic matters, one country may even belong to more than one grouping, but for the most part membership will largely be based on location on the Continent. This will not happen overnight. Germany, France and other core economies have a vested interest in preserving the eurozone in its current form for the short-term — perhaps as long as another decade — since the economic contagion from Greece is an existential concern for the moment. In the long-term, however, regional organizations of like-minded blocs is the path that seems to be evolving in Europe, especially if Germany decides that its relationship with core eurozone countries and Central Europe is more important than its relationship with the periphery.

We can separate the blocs into four main fledgling groupings, which are not mutually exclusive, as a sort of model to depict the evolving relationships among countries in Europe:

  1. The German sphere of influence (Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Czech Republic, Hungary, Croatia, Switzerland, Slovenia, Slovakia and Finland): These core eurozone economies are not disadvantaged by Germany’s competitiveness, or they depend on German trade for economic benefit, and they are not inherently threatened by Germany’s evolving relationship with Russia. Due to its isolation from the rest of Europe and proximity to Russia, Finland is not thrilled about Russia’s resurgence, but occasionally it prefers Germany’s careful accommodative approach to the aggressive approach of neighboring Sweden or Poland. Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are the most concerned about the Russia-Germany relationship, but not to the extent that Poland and the Baltic states are, and they may decide to remain in the German sphere of influence for economic reasons.
  2. The Nordic regional bloc (Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia): These mostly non-eurozone states generally see Russia’s resurgence in a negative light. The Baltic states are seen as part of the Nordic sphere of influence (especially Sweden’s), which leads toward problems with Russia. Germany is an important trade partner, but it is also seen as overbearing and as a competitor. Finland straddles this group and the German sphere of influence, depending on the issue.
  3. Visegrad-plus (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria). At the moment, the Visegrad Four belong to different spheres of influence. The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary do not feel as exposed to Russia’s resurgence as Poland or Romania do. But they also are not completely satisfied with Germany’s attitude toward Russia. Poland is not strong enough to lead this group economically the way Sweden dominates the Nordic bloc. Other than security cooperation, the Visegrad countries have little to offer each other at the moment. Poland intends to change that by lobbying for more funding for new EU member states in the next six months of its EU presidency. That still does not constitute economic leadership.
  4. Mediterranean Europe (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Cyprus and Malta): These are Europe’s peripheral states. Their security concerns are unique due to their exposure to illegal immigration via routes through Turkey and North Africa. Geographically, these countries are isolated from the main trade routes and lack the capital-generating centers of northern Europe, save for Italy’s Po River Valley (which in many ways does not belong to this group but could be thought of as a separate entity that could be seen as part of the German sphere of influence). These economies therefore face similar problems of over-indebtedness and lack of competitiveness. The question is, who would lead?

And then there are France and the United Kingdom. These countries do not really belong to any bloc. This is London’s traditional posture with regard to continental Europe, although it has recently begun to establish a relationship with the Nordic-Baltic group. France, meanwhile, could be considered part of the German sphere of influence. Paris is attempting to hold onto its leadership role in the eurozone and is revamping its labor-market rules and social benefits to sustain its connection to the German-dominated currency bloc, a painful process. However, France traditionally is also a Mediterranean country and has considered Central European alliances in order to surround Germany. It also recently entered into a new bilateral military relationship with the United Kingdom, in part as a hedge against its close relationship with Germany. If France decides to exit its partnership with Germany, it could quickly gain control of its normal sphere of influence in the Mediterranean, probably with enthusiastic backing from a host of other powers such as the United States and the United Kingdom. In fact, its discussion of a Mediterranean Union was a political hedge, an insurance policy, for exactly such a future.

The Price of Regional Hegemony

The alternative to the regionalization of Europe is clear German leadership that underwrites — economically and politically — greater European integration. If Berlin can overcome the anti-euro populism that is feeding on bailout fatigue in the eurozone core, it could continue to support the periphery and prove its commitment to the eurozone and the European Union. Germany is also trying to show Central Europe that its relationship with Russia is a net positive by using its negotiations with Moscow over Moldova as an example of German political clout.

Central Europeans, however, are already putting Germany’s leadership and commitment to the test. Poland assumes the EU presidency July 1 and has made the union’s commitment to increase funding for new EU member states, as well as EU defense cooperation, its main initiatives. Both policies are a test for Germany and an offer for it to reverse the ongoing security regionalization. If Berlin says no to new money for the newer EU member states — at stake is the union’s cohesion-policy funding, which in the 2007-2013 budget period totaled 177 billion euros — and no to EU-wide security/defense arrangements, then Warsaw, Prague and other Central European capitals have their answer. The question is whether Germany is serious about being a leader of Europe and paying the price to be the hegemon of a united Europe, which would not only mean funding bailouts but also standing up to Russia. If it places its relationship with Russia over its alliance with Central Europe, then it will be difficult for Central Europeans to follow Berlin. This will mean that the regionalization of Europe’s security architecture — via the Visegrad Group and Nordic-Baltic battle groups — makes sense. It will also mean that Central Europeans will have to find new ways to draw the United States into the region for security.

Common security perception is about states understanding that they share the same fate. American states understood this at the end of the 18th century, which is why they gave up their independence, setting the United States on the path toward superpower status. Europeans — at least at present — do not see their situation (or the world) in the same light. Bailouts are enacted not because Greeks share the same fate as Germans but because German bankers share the same fate as German taxpayers. This is a sign that integration has progressed to a point where economic fate is shared, but this is an inadequate baseline on which to build a common political union.

Bailing out Greece is seen as an affront to the German taxpayer, even though that same German taxpayer has benefited disproportionally from the eurozone’s creation. The German government understands the benefits of preserving the eurozone — which is why it continues bailing out the peripheral countries — but there has been no national debate in Germany to explain this logic to the populace. Germany is still waiting to have an open conversation with itself about its role and its future, and especially what price it is willing to pay for regional hegemony and remaining relevant in a world fast becoming dominated by powers capable of harnessing the resources of entire continents.

Without a coherent understanding in Europe that its states all share the same fate, the Greek crisis has little chance of being Europe’s Shays’ Rebellion, triggering deeper unification. Instead of a United States of Europe, its fate will be ongoing regionalization.

Reactia FRJ MediaSind fata de protestul lui Adrian Sobaru

Federatia Romana a Jurnalistilor MediaSind este alaturi de suferinta colegului Adrian Sobaru, angajat al Societatii Romane de Televiziune, membru al Sindicatului pentru Unitatea Salariatilor TV, afiliat MediaSind.

FRJ MediaSind considera ca gestul disperat al colegului nostru este determinat de politica iresponsabila si inumana promovata de  Guvern impotriva propriilor cetateni, precum si de hotararea actualei puteri de  a nu accepta nicio forma de dialog cu partenerii sociali.

In dimineata zilei de 23 decembrie a.c., In timpul sedintei In care se dezbatea motiunea de cenzura Impotriva Guvernului Boc, Adrian Sobaru s-a aruncat, In semn de protest,  de la balconul Parlamentului, strigand  „Pentru tine, Boc ! Asta este viata pe care o traim noi!

El purta un tricou pe care era scris „ Ne-ati ciuruit si ne-ati vandut, ne-ati ucis viitorul copiilor nostri, libertatea!” In timp ce era transportat pe targa, acesta a mai avut puterea sa strige Libertate!

Adrian Sobaru In varsta de 43 de ani, are doi copii, dintre care unul sufera de autism, familia sa avand mari probleme financiare pentru asigurarea tratamentului necesar, In urma eliminarii de catre guvern a unor drepturi pentru copiii cu deficiente.

FRJ MediaSind si Sindicatul pentru Unitatea Salariatilor TV vor sprijini prin toate mijloacele, inclusiv financiar, pe Adrian Sobaru si familia sa. FRJ MediaSind atrage atentia ca acest caz nu este unul izolat.

In data de 18 noiembrie a.c. un alt angajat al televiziunii publice,  In varsta de 45 de ani, s-a spanzurat din cauza situatiei financiare precare In care se afla.

FRJ MediaSind  face un apel la membrii sai aflati In  situatii disperate sa nu aleaga ca solutie de rezolvare a problemelor astfel de proteste  care pun In pericol viata  sau integritatea fizica. Cerem  guvernantilor sa puna capat actualei politici inumane Indreptate Impotriva propriilor cetateni, deoarece disperarea populatiei a atins cote dramatice.

Comitetul Executiv al FRJ MediaSind

Material preluat de pe websitul SROSCAS.ro

Romania analizata de George Friedman (Stratfor.com)

In school, many of us learned the poem Invictus. It concludes with the line, “I am the master of my fate, I am the captain of my soul.” This is a line that a Victorian gentleman might bequeath to an American businessman. It is not a line that resonates in Romania. Nothing in their history tells Romanians that they rule their fate or dominate their soul. Everything in their history is a lesson in how fate masters them or how their very soul is a captive of history. As a nation, Romanians have modest hopes and expectations tempered by their past.

This sensibility is not alien to me. My parents survived the Nazi death camps, returned to Hungary to try to rebuild their lives and then found themselves fleeing the communists. When they arrived in America, their wishes were extraordinarily modest, as I look back on it. They wanted to be safe, to get up in the morning, to go to work, to get paid — to live. They were never under the impression that they were the masters of their fate.

The problem that Romania has is that the world cares about it. More precisely, empires collide where Romania is. The last iteration was the Cold War. Today, at the moment, things seem easier, or at least less desperate, than before. Still, as I discussed in Borderlands, the great powers are sorting themselves out again and therefore Romania is becoming more important to others. It is not clear to me that the Romanians fully appreciate the shift in the geopolitical winds. They think they can hide in Europe, and perhaps they can. But I suspect that history is reaching for Romania again.

Geopolitics and Self-Mutilation

Begin with geography. The Carpathian Mountains define Romania, but in an odd way. Rather than serving as the border of the country, protecting it, the Carpathians are an arc that divides the country into three parts. To the south of the mountains is the Wallachian Plain, the heart of contemporary Romania, where its capital, Bucharest, and its old oil center, Ploesti, are located. In the east of the Carpathians is the Moldavian Plain. To the northwest of the Carpathians is Transylvania, more rugged, hilly country.

And this is the geopolitical tragedy of Romania. Romania is one nation divided by its geography. None of the three parts is easy to defend. Transylvania came under Hungarian rule in the 11th century, and Hungary came under Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian rule. Wallachia came under Ottoman rule, and Moldavia came under Ottoman and Russian rule. About the only time before the late 19th century that Romania was united was when it was completely conquered. And the only time it was completely conquered was when some empire wanted to secure the Carpathians to defend itself.

Some of us experience geopolitics as an opportunity. Most of humanity experiences it as a catastrophe. Romania has been a nation for a long time, but rarely has it been a united nation-state. After becoming a nation-state in the late 19th century, it had a precarious existence, balanced between Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Russia, with Germany a more distant but powerful reality. Romania spent the inter-war years trying to find its balance between monarchy, authoritarianism and fascism, and it never quite found it. It sought safety in an alliance with Hitler and found itself on the front lines in the German invasion of Russia. To understand Romania as an ally one must bear this in mind: When the Soviets began their great counterattack at Stalingrad, they launched it over Romanian (and Hungarian) troops. Romanians maneuvered themselves into the position of fighting and dying for the Germans, and then got their revenge on the Germans by being slaughtered by the Soviets.

All of this led to Romania’s occupation by the Soviets, toward whom the Romanians developed a unique strategy. The Hungarians rose up against the Soviets and were crushed, and the Czechoslovaks tried to create a liberal communist regime that was still loyal to the Soviets and were crushed. The Romanians actually achieved a degree of autonomy from the Soviets in foreign affairs. The way the Romanians got the Soviets to tolerate this was by building a regime more rigid and oppressive than even that of the Soviet Union at the time. The Soviets knew NATO wasn’t going to invade, let alone invade through Romania. So long as the Romanian regime kept the people in line, the Russians could tolerate their maneuvers. Romania retained its national identity and an independent foreign policy but at a stunning price in personal freedom and economic well-being.

Contemporary Romania cannot be understood without understanding Nicolae Ceausescu. He called himself the “Genius of the Carpathians.” He may well have been, but if so, the Carpathian definition of genius is idiosyncratic. The Romanian communist government was built around communists who had remained in Romania during World War II, in prison or in hiding. This was unique among the Soviet Union’s Eastern European satellites. Stalin didn’t trust communists who stayed home and resisted. He preferred communists who had fled to Moscow in the 1930s and had proved themselves loyal to Stalin by their betrayal of others. He sent Moscow communists to rule the rest of the newly occupied countries that buffered Russia from the West. Not so in Romania, where native communists ruled. After the death of the founder of communist Romania, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, another Romanian communist who stayed in Romania ultimately took over: Ceausescu. This was a peculiarity of Romanian communism that made it more like Josip Broz Tito’s Yugoslavia in foreign policy, and more like a bad dream in domestic policy.

Ceausescu decided to pay off the national debt. His reason seemed to flow from his foreign policy — he didn’t want Romania to be trapped by any country because of its debt — and he repaid it by selling to other countries nearly everything that was produced in Romania. This left Romania in staggering poverty; electricity and heat were occasional things, and even food was scarce in a country that had a lot of it. The Securitate, a domestic secret police whose efficiency and brutality were impressive, suppressed unrest. Nothing in Romania worked as well as the Securitate.

Herta Muller is a Romanian author who writes in German (she is part of Romania’s ethnic German community) and who won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2009. One of her books, The Appointment, takes place in Romania under the communists. It gives an extraordinary sense of a place ruled by the Securitate. It is about a woman who is living her life, working at her job and dealing with an alcoholic husband while constantly preparing for and living in dread of appointments with the secret police. As in Kafka, what they are looking for and what she is hiding are unclear. But the danger is unrelenting and permeates her entire consciousness. When one reads this book, as I did in preparing for this trip, one understands the way in which the Securitate tore apart a citizen’s soul — and remembers that it was not a distant relic of the 1930s but was still in place and sustaining the Romanian regime in 1989.

It was as if the price that Romania had to pay for autonomy was to punch itself in the face continually. Even the fall of communism took a Romanian path. There was no Velvet Revolution here but a bloody one, where the Securitate resisted the anti-communist rising under circumstances and details that are still hotly debated and unclear. In the end, the Ceausescus (Nicolae’s wife Elena was also a piece of work, requiring a psychological genius to unravel) were executed and the Securitate blended into civil society as part of the organized-crime network that was mistaken for liberalization in the former Soviet empire by Western academics and reporters at the time.

Romania emerged from the previous 70 years of ongoing catastrophe by dreaming of simple things and having no illusions that these things were easy to come by or things Romanians could control. As with much of Eastern Europe but perhaps with a greater intensity, Romanians believed their redemption lay with the West’s multilateral organizations. If they were permitted to join NATO and especially the European Union, their national security needs would be taken care of along with their economic needs. Romanians yearned to become European simply because being Romanian was too dangerous.

The Redemption of Being European

In thinking of Romania, the phrase “institutionalized prisoner” comes to mind. In the United States it is said that if someone stays in prison long enough, he becomes “institutionalized,” someone who can no longer imagine functioning outside a world where someone else always tells him what to do. For Romania, national sovereignty has always been experienced as the process of accommodating itself to more powerful nations and empires. So after 1991, Romania searched for the “someone else” to which it could subordinate itself. More to the point, Romania imbued these entities with extraordinary redemptive powers. Once in NATO and the European Union, all would be well.

And until recently, all has been well, or well in terms of the modest needs of a historical victim. The problem Romania has is that these sanctuaries are in many ways illusions. It looks to NATO for defense, but NATO is a hollowed-out entity. There is a new and ambitious NATO strategy, which sets a global agenda for the organization. Long discussed, it is an exercise in meaninglessness. Countries like Germany have no military with which to fulfill the strategy, assuming that any agreement to act could be reached. NATO is a consensual organization, and a single member can block any mission. The divergent interests of an expanded NATO guarantee that someone will block everything. NATO is an illusion that comforts the Romanians, but only if they don’t look carefully. The Romanians seem to prefer the comforting illusion.

As for the European Union, there is a deep structural tension in the system. The main European economic power is Germany. It is also the world’s second-largest exporter. Its economy is built around exporting. For a country like Romania, economic development requires that it take advantage of its wage advantage. Lower wages allow developing countries to develop their economy through exports. But Europe is dominated by an export superpower. Unlike the postwar world, where the United States absorbed the imports of Germany and Japan without needing to compete with them, Germany remains an exporting country exporting into Romania and leaving precious little room for Romania to develop its economy.

At this stage of its development, Romania should be running a trade surplus, particularly with Germany, but it is not. In 2007, it exported about $40 billion worth of goods and imported about $70 billion. In 2009, it exported the same $40 billion but cut imports to only $54 billion (still a negative). Forty percent of its trade is with Germany, France and Italy, its major EU partners. But it is Germany where the major problem is. And this problem is compounded by the fact that a good part of Romania’s exports to Germany are from German-owned firms operating in Romania.

During the period of relative prosperity in Europe from 1991 to 2008, the structural reality of the EU was hidden under a rising tide. In 2008 the tide went out, revealing the structural reality. It is not clear when the tide of prosperity will come rolling back in. In the meantime, while the German economy is growing again, Romania’s is not. Because it exists in a system where the main engine is an exporter, and the exporter dominates the process of setting rules, it is difficult to see how Romania can take advantage of its greatest asset — a skilled workforce prepared to work for lower wages.

Add to this the regulatory question. Romania is a developing country. Europe’s regulations are drawn with a focus on the highly developed countries. The laws on employment guarantees mean that Europeans don’t hire workers, they adopt them. That means that entrepreneurship is difficult. Being an entrepreneur, as I well know, means making mistakes and recovering from them fast. Given the guarantees that every worker has in Europe, an entrepreneur cannot quickly recover from his mistakes. In Romania, the agility needed for risk-taking is not readily available under EU rules drawn up for a mature economy.

Romania should be a country of small entrepreneurs, and it is, but there is extensive evasion of Brussels’ — and Bucharest’s — regulations. It is a gray market that creates legal jeopardy and therefore corruption in the sector that Romania needs the most. Imagine if Germany had the regulations it champions today in 1955. Could it possibly have developed into what it is in 2010? There may be a time for these regulations (and that is debatable), but for Romania it is not now.

I met a Romanian entrepreneur who marketed industrial products. In talking to him, I raised the question of the various regulations governing his industry and how he handled them. There was no clear answer or, more precisely, I didn’t realize the answer he had given me until later. There are regulations and there are relationships. The latter mitigate the former. In Germany this might be called corruption. In Romania it is survival. A Romanian entrepreneur rigorously following EU regulations would rapidly go out of business. It may be that Romania is corrupt, but the regulatory structure of the EU imposed on a developing economy makes evasion the only rational strategy. And yet the entrepreneur I talked to was a champion of the European Union. He too hoped for the time when he could be a normal European. As Rousseau said, “I have seen these contradictions and they have not rebuffed me.”

It is difficult to for an outsider to see the specific benefits of NATO and EU membership for Romania. But for the Romanians, membership goes beyond the specifics.

Romania’s Choice

August and September are bad months in Europe. It is when wars and crises strike. August and September 2008 were bad months. That August, Russia struck Georgia. In September, the financial crisis burst wide open. In the first, Russia delivered a message to the region: This is what American guarantees are worth. In the European handling of the financial crisis in Eastern Europe, the Germans delivered a message on the limits of German responsibility. Both NATO and the European Union went from being guarantors of Romanian interests to being enormous question marks.

In my conversations with Romanians, at all levels and almost universally, I have found the same answer. First, there is no doubt that NATO and the European Union did not work in Romania’s favor at the moment. Second, there is no question of rethinking Romania’s commitment to either. There are those Romanians, particularly on the far right, who dislike the European Union in particular, but Romania has no strategic alternative.

As for the vast majority, they cannot and will not conceive of a Romania outside the confines of NATO and the European Union. The mere fact that neither is working well for Romania does not mean that they do not do something important: NATO and the European Union keep the anti-democratic demons of the Romanian soul at bay. Being part of Europe is not simply a matter of strategic or economic benefits. It represents a transitional point in Romanian history. With membership in the European Union and NATO, Romania has affirmed its modernity and its democratic institutions. These twin amulets have redeemed Romania’s soul. Given this, I suppose, an unfavorable trade balance and the absence of genuine security guarantees is a small price to pay. I am not Romanian, so I can’t feel their ineffable belief in Brussels.

Romanians do acknowledge, again almost universally, the return of Russia to the historical stage, and it worries them. Of particular concern is Moldova, a region to the east that was historically Romanian, taken by the Soviets in a treaty with Hitler and the rest of which was seized after World War II. Moldova became an independent country in 1991 (a country I will be visiting next). For much of the post-Cold War period it had a communist government that fell a few years ago. An election will be held on Nov. 28, and it appears that the communists might return. The feeling is that if the communists return this time, the Russians will return with them and, in the coming years, Russian troops will be on Romania’s borders.

Romanian officials are actively engaged in discussions with NATO officials about the Russians, but the Germans want a more active involvement of Russia in NATO and not tension between NATO and Russia. The Western Europeans are not about to be drawn into Eastern European paranoia fed by nostalgic American strategists wanting to relive the Cold War, as they think of it.

I raised two strategic alternatives with Romanian officials and the media. One was the Intermarium — an alliance, perhaps in NATO, perhaps not — of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. (To readers who asked why I did not go to Bulgaria on this trip, it was simply a matter of time. I will go there as soon as I can.) Very interestingly, one official pointed out substantial levels of cooperation on military planning between Hungary and Romania and discussions between Romania and Poland. How serious this is and whether it will go beyond the NATO context is unclear to me. Perhaps I can get a better sense in Warsaw.

But military planning is one thing; the wherewithal to execute military plans is quite another. The Romanians are now caught in a crisis over buying fighter planes. There are three choices: the Swedish Gripen, the Eurofighter and used American F-16s. The problem is that the Romanians don’t have the money for any of these aircraft, nor does it seem to me that these are the defense measures they really need. The Americans can provide air cover in a number of ways, and while 24 F-16s would have value, they would not solve Romania’s most pressing military problem. From where I sit, creating an effective mobile force to secure their eastern frontier is what is needed. The alternative I’ve heard was buying naval vessels to block a very real Russian naval buildup in the Black Sea. But if Romania has trouble buying 24 fighters, naval vessels are out of the question.

The Romanians are approaching defense planning from a NATO perspective — one used for planning, not implementation, and one that always leads to sophisticated systems while leaving the basics uncovered. This may seem like an unnecessary level of detail for this essay, but the Romanians are deep in this discussion, and questions like this are the critical details of strategies growing out of geopolitics. It is the difference between planning papers drawn up by think tanks and the ability to defend a nation.

The Black Sea is a critical part of Romania’s reality, and the rise of Turkey makes the system of relationships interesting. Turkey is Romania’s fourth largest export target, and one of the few major trading partners that imports more from Romania than it exports. I pointed out to Romanians that it is the great good fortune of Turkey that it was not admitted to the European Union. Turkey’s economy grew by an annualized rate of 12 percent in the first quarter of 2010 and has been surging for years.

Turkey is becoming a regional economic engine and, unlike Germany, France and Italy, it offers compatibilities and synergies for Romania. In addition, Turkey is a serious military force and, while not seeking confrontation with Russia, it is not subservient to it. Turkey has adopted a “360 degree” strategy of engagement with all countries. And since Turkey is a NATO member, as are Hungary, Slovakia and Poland, there is no incompatibility with a dual strategy of the Intermarium and the Black Sea. For now, they fit. And the irony of Romania reaching out to the heir to the Ottomans is simply that and no more. This is the neighborhood that Romania inhabits. These are the options it has.

What doesn’t fit for Romania is the NATO/EU system alone. Perhaps this is part of a rational mix, but it cannot be all of it. For Romania, the problem is to move beyond the psychological comfort of Europe to a strategic and economic understanding that accepts that the post-Cold War world is over. More important, it would be a move toward accepting that Romania is free, responsible for its future and capable of managing it.

It is this last step that is the hardest for Romania and many of the former Soviet satellites — which were also bound up with World War I and Hitler’s disaster — to come to terms with. There is a connection between buying more expensive German cars than you can afford, and more of them than you need, and the novels of Herta Muller. The appointment can be permanently cancelled, but the fear of the interrogation is always with you. In this region, the fear of the past dominates and oppresses while the confident, American-style military planning and economic restructuring I suggested is alien and frightening.

The Romanians emerged from a world of horror, some of it of their own making. They fear themselves perhaps more than they fear others. For them, becoming European is both a form of therapy and something that will restrain the demons within and without. When you live with bad memories, you live with the shadows of reality. For the Romanians, illusory solutions to haunting memories make a great deal of sense.

It makes sense until war comes, and in this part of the world, the coming of war has been the one certainty since before the Romans. It is only a question of when, with whom and what your own fate will be when it arrives. The Romanians believe with religious fervor that these things will be left behind if they become part of Europe. I am more skeptical. I had thought that Romania’s problem was that it was part of Europe, a weak power surrounded by stronger ones. They seem to believe that their solution is to be part of Europe, a weak power surrounded by stronger ones.

I leave Romania confused. The Romanians hear things that I am deaf to. It is even at a pitch my Hungarian part can’t hear. I leave now for another nation, Moldova, which has been even more exposed to history, one even stranger and more brutal than Romania’s.

Case-study: Chavez invins de alianta transdoctrinara „Unidad Venezuela”

Duminica, 26 septembrie 2010 s-au desfasurat alegerile parlamentare in Venezuela. Tara latinoamericana este condusa de un dictator, Hugo Chavez, legitimat politic printr-o lovitura de stat (2002), urmat de un referendum (2004) (care ingradeste pregativele parlamentului unicameral), alegeri parlamentare (2005) din care partidul-stat „Partidul Socialist Unit din Venezuela” a castigat139 din cele 167 mandate parlamentare.

Opozitia a reusit sa castige la ultimele alegeri 65 din 165 mandate parlamentare.

Rezultate alegeri parlamentare

Sistem de vot mix: 50% uninominal, 50% proportional

Participare la vot: 11.054.674, 66,74%

PSUV 5.259.998 voturi valabil exprimate, 58,79%, 97 parlamentari

PPT Patria por Todos  (socialisti calibrati pe segmentul etnic indigen)

320.260 voturi valabil epxrimate, 1,83%, 2 parlamentari.

Unidad National 5.448.864 voturi valabil exprimate, 39,38%, 65 parlamentari

Repartizare mandate castigate de catre alianta electorala „Unidad National”:

PODEMOS Por la Democracia Social (socialdemocrati) 4 mandate

Acción Democrática AD (socialdemocrati) 14 mandate

Primero Justicia PJ (social-liberali) 6 mandate

La Causa Radical (socialdemocrati) 3 mandate

Proyecto Venezuela (social-liberali) 3 mandate

Cuentas Claras (socialdemocrati) 1 mandat

Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente COPEI (crestindemocrati) 8 mandate

Un Nuevo Tiempo (socialdemocrati) 17 mandate

In 2012 se vor desfasura alegeri prezidentiale. Candidatul opozitiei se va alege intre partidele majore. In prezent formatiuniile socialdemocrate detin majoritate in alianta. Este posibil ca socialdemocratii sa propuna candidatul prezidential, iar crestindemocratii premierul.

Coalitia electorala”Mesa de la Unidad Democratica” sa infiintat in iunie 2009 si cuprinde 50 de partide din intregul spectrul politic.

Printre membrii fondatori se numara:

COPEI – Partido Popular (crestindemocrati)

Accion Democratica (socialdemocrati) (socialconservatori-neoliberali)

Partidul Liberal din Venezuela a guvernat aceasta tara in perioada 1840-1897. In prezent diferitele curente liberale (social-liberalism, progresism, libertarianism, neoconservatorism) sau unificat in platforma Organizacion por la Democracia Liberal en Venezuela ODLV. Formatiunea principala este Movimiento Democracia Liberal.

Think-tank liberal: CEDICE Libertad (Centrul de analiza si cercetare liberala)

Bloguri liberale: El Republicano Liberal

Fundatiile, organizatiile civice din America Latina sau unificat  in platforma RELIAL.

Postul de televiziune al opozitiei: GloboVision

Piata Universitatii de Dreapta – trecut, prezent si realpolitik

10 iunie – Conferinţa „Mineriada din 13-15 iunie 1990, după douăzeci de ani: punctul nostru de vedere”
– Sala Senatului Universitatii din Bucuresti – intre orele 10:00 si 13:00 – Masa Rotunda.
– Sala Consiliului Facultatii de Istorie – intre orele 16:00 si 20:00 – Atelier.

12 iunie – In Piaţa Universităţii din Bucureşti, Tineretul National Liberal va organiza un miting ce va avea ca mesaj central : „Dreapta autentică se uneşte pentru România/Un nou început după 20 de ani”.
Participanţi: membrii PNL şi PNŢCD şi reprezentanţi ai societăţii civile.
Ora: 18:00
Invitaţi/vorbitori: lideri ai PNL şi ai PNŢCD, Doina Cornea, surorile Coposu, Zoe Petre, Victor Rebengiuc, Lucia Hossu-Longin ş.a
Prezentator (amfitrion): Victor Rebengiuc/Mircea Diaconu.

In perioada 13-15 iunie nu s-au obtinut autorizatii pentru mitinguri. Doar Asociatia Victimelor Mineriadelor a primit autorizatie pentru o expozitie foto (fara sonor) pe tema: „20 de ani de la represiunea din iunie 1990 – Mineriada”, autorizatie pe care o puteti verifica aici: http://avmr.ro/aprobare-13-15-iunie-in-pasajul-universitii.html

Conferinţa „Mineriada din 13-15 iunie 1990, după douăzeci de ani: punctul nostru de vedere”

10 iunie 2010

– teme de dezbatere pentru masa rotundă şi atelier –

Piaţa Universității și construcția societății civile din România
Piața Universității ca fenomen social
Organizații și organizatori ai Pieței Universităţii
Balconul Facultatii de Geologie, tribună a democraţiei
Ecoul internațional al manifestației din Piața Universității
Manipularea prin TVR şi ziarele FSN-iste asupra Pieţei Universităţii
Presa democratică anticomunistă şi anti FSN-istă
Pregătirea represiunii Pieţei Universităţii
Rolul preşedintelui, Guvernului şi FSN-ului
Implicarea serviciilor secrete în pregătirea şi organizarea represiunii
Preliminarii la atacul minerilor: invadarea Institutului de Arhitectură de către gărzile FSN-iste de la IMGB
Diversiunile din 13 iunie: incendierea autobuzelor de către Poliţie, autoincendierea sediului Poliţiei, invadarea televizată a TVR
Chemarea minerilor pentru restabilirea ordinii
Intervenţia trupelor de ordine şi omorârea unor civili nevinovaţi
Transportul şi sosirea minerilor în Bucureşti
Atacul minerilor şi falşilor mineri, organizaţi şi conduşi de agenţii serviciilor secrete, asupra sediilor partidelor şi asociaţiilor civice
Arestarea ilegală, torturarea şi anchetarea participanţilor la Piaţa Universităţii, în unităţile militare de la Măgurele şi Băneasa
Pogromul asupra rromilor din cartierele de la periferia Bucureştiului
Ecoul internaţional al respresiunii şi daunele produse României în plan politic, economic şi social
Exodul tinerei generaţii în Occident
Rolul Poliţiei, Armatei şi Procuraturii în mineriada din 13-15 iunie
Blocarea anchetelor asupra evenimentelor din 13-15 iunie de către Poliţie şi Procuratură, în perioadele 1990-1997 şi 2001-2004
Manipularea mediatică a adevărului istoric asupra evenimentelor din 13-15 iunie

Autor: Lilick

Material: Fundatia Romana pentru Democratie

Despre fenomenul politic Piata Universitatii la Cluj cititi mai jos:

In primavara lui 1990, prea mic fiind pentru a participa activ la eveniment, urmaream totusi cu sufletul la gura ce se intampla in legatura cu fenomenul “Piata Universitatii”. Dupa scoala fugeama casa sa-mi fac cat mai repede temele, pentru a asculta pe urma la radio (Europa Libera sau BBC) ce s-a mai intamplat in Bucuresti, TVR-ul nu imi inspira multa incredere.

Putina lume stie ca si Clujul a avut o “piata a Universitatii”: piata Libertatii din centrul orasului, dominata de biserica gotica si statuia lui Matei Corvin.

Am gasit cateva materiale interesante despre acea perioada:

Un interviu cu doamna Doina Cornea despre primavara clujeana si bucuresteana a anului 1990

Un reportaj in Adevarul (care este si sursa foto) despre golaniada clujeana

O revista a presei clujene si centrale despre evenimentele din 13 -14 iunie (apare si CTP care incerca sa convinga cititorii ca pe 13 iunie a avut loc o tentativa de lovitura de stat).

Autor: Transildania

Analiza AliantaDreptei:

Orice analiza decantata la dreapta, contine o declinare la trecut, prezent si mai ales la coordonatele realpolitikului.

Prinviind spre trecut este necesar sa constatam ca autorul politic si moral ale represalilor din 13-15 iunie 1990 este Miscarea Politica Frontul Salvarii Nationale. Din aceasta formatiune politica au emanat doua partide politice parlamentare: Partidul Democrat si Partidul Socialdemocrat.

Daca revolutia din decembrie 1989 a fost de stanga, atunci manifestatia din Piata Universitatii a fost contrarevolutia libertatii.

A inceput la 22 aprilie cu mitingurile electorale ale PNTCD si Uniunii Democrate de Centru (alianta de partide din care au facut parte o serie de formatiuni de centru si centru-dreapta) din care enumar: Partidul Socialist-Liberal condus de Niculae Cerveni, Partidul Democrat din Cluj, Partidul Frontului Democrat infiintat la 17 decembrie 1989 la Timisoara (prima formatiune politica din Romania postcomunista).

Dupa 13-15 iunie Grupul Democrat de Centru sa destramat: Partidul Socialist-Liberal a fuzionat prin absorbtie in PNL, dar nu a fost radiat din registrul partidelor politice. In aprilie 1992 pe structura juridica PSL urma sa se infiinteze Partidul National Liberal-Conventia Democratica.

Partidul Democrat din Cluj a fuzionat prin absorbtie in Partidul National Liberal-Aripa Tanara. O fractiune din PNL-CD a fuzionat cu PNL-AT, formand Partidul Liberal 1993.

In 1997 PNL-CD si PL-93 au fuzionat in Partidul Liberal. In septembrie 98 Partidul Liberal a fuzionat in PNL.

Din structuriile PNL-AT/PL’93/PL sa format Fundatia Rene Radu Policrat, devenita ulterior Fundatia Horia Rusu. Horia Rusu a decedat 2 saptamini inaintea congresului PNL, congres care la ales pe Valeriu Stoica drept presedinte PNL. Cu siguranta un PNL condus de Horia Rusu ar fi avut alta traiectorie, decat PNL-ul condus de Valeriu Stoica si Theodor Stolojan.

Partidul Frontului Democrat a fuzionat cu Partidul Democrat, care in 1993 a fuzionat cu Frontul Salvarii Nationale, devenit ulterior FSN (PD), rebotezat PD, actualmente PD-L.

In iunie 1990 PNL se afla in corzi. Sediul central era devastat pentru a treia oara intr-un interval de 6 luni, iar in interiorul partidului se structura ramura disidenta Aripa Tanara, din care in iulie 1990 va emana Partidul National Liberal-Aripa Tanara. 20 de ani mai tarziu PNL-AT , traieste politic prin Fundatia Horia Rusu.

Partidul Socialdemocrat, partid de stanga a fost si ramine adversarul  discursiv al Partidului National Liberal. Acest joc democratic, aceasta regula academica ar fi valabila daca am trai intr-o tara democratica. Realitatea este ca Romania se afla la marginea prapastiei. In termeni economici Romania este un failed state.

Iar falimentul de stat se va cupla cu implozia politica al partidului-stat. Iar falimentul de stat este inevitabil. Un factor decisiv este reforma monetara din zona euro, care va veni peste Romania asemenea unui tsunami.

Falimentul politic va demara totodata descompunerea organizatorica al partidului-stat, iar acest proces va genera competitia politica intre stanga si dreapta.

Piata Universitatii din perioada 22.04-15.06.1990 a fost un fenomen politic al miscariilor civice postrevolutionare.

In istoria noastra exista insa Piata Universitatii de Dreapta. Si aceasta o consemna prin demonstatia din 8 noiembrie 1945. La 8 noiembrie 1945 organizatiile de tineret PNL si PNTCD au organizat prima manifestatie anticomunista, antitotalitara si promonarhista din Romania.

8 noiembrie 1945 este Piata Universitatii de Dreapta!

8 noiembrie 1945 este revolutia noastra! 8 noiembrie 1945 este contrarevolutia libertatii!

Traditie, ordine si prosperitate ar fi sloganul acestei constructii politice.

Un asemenea amalgam politic ar putea sa castige viitoarele alegeri locale, parlamentare si prezidentiale cu o majoritate absoluta.

Si imi justific aceasta afirmatie cu modele politice aplicate cu succes in sistemele politice ale Uniunii Europene.

– In Germania, Partidul Liberal a castigat in perioada 2008-10 toate scrutinurile electorale (locale, regionale, legislative si europarlamentare) cu o medie de 15% si cu un surplus de voturi valabil exprimate cuantificat la 500.000.

– In Cehia, doua partide liberale (TOP’09 si Miscarea Politica „Interesul Public”) proaspat infiintate au obtinut impreuna 27,58%. Rezultat care pozitioneaza aceste formatiuni pe primul loc.

– In Slovacia, formatiunea SaS (Solidaritate si Libertate) este cotata la cca. 13,7% si este curtata intens de potentialii parteneri de guvernare din stanga si dreapta esichierului politic.

– In Marea Britanie, Partidul Liberal Britanic LibDem a revenit dupa 87 de ani la guvernare.

– In Olanda, formatiuniile liberale VVD si D’66 insumeaza impreuna 28,35%, scor care va propulsa aceste formatiuni la guvernare.

– In Franta, fostul premier Dominique du Villepin va infiinta la 19 iunie a.c. o noua formatiune de centru, care va calibra elemente liberale si neogaulliste. Este de asteptat ca viitoarea formatiune liberala sa fileteze segmente importante din UMP. Si in Franta, neogaullismul se indreapta spre liberalism.

– In Italia, presedintele Camerei Deputatilor, Gianfranco Fini, pana in trecut partener de guvernare in executivul Berlusconi, co-presedinte al PdL, si-a configurat propria formatiune liberala. Liderul „Generatione Italia” isi propune castigarea alegerilor parlamentare din 2013. Si in Italia membrii PdL sau saturat de populism, demagogie si manipulare publica.

Liberali si taranisti strangeti randurile!

Gabriel Savulescu

GSPublicRelations2010

Citeste la Dreapta!

Citeste http://AliantaDreptei.wordpress.com

Buget si fiscalitate liberala anti-criza

Autor:  Octavian Ungureanu

Investitii:
– Orice investitie ar trebui facuta numai dupa realizarea unui proiect asemanator proiectelor de finantare europeana, cu prioritate, bineinteles, pentru proiectele avand cofinantare europeana…. Vezi mai mult
– Verificarea prin sondaj a ofertelor prin solicitarea anonima de oferte.
– Eliminarea clauzelor anticoncurentiale (pentru proiectarea salilor de sport, firmele trebuie sa aiba experienta similara in proiectarea salilor de sport pentru scoli).
– Crearea unui corp de evaluatori/verificatori pentru a stabili daca proiectele sunt complete.
– Interzicerea suplimentarii bugetelor cu mai mult de 5%-10%.
– Extinderea obligatorie a garantarii FNGCIMM pentru programele europene fara cofinantare (in sectorul privat).
– Concesionarea constructiei de autostrazi, cai ferate.
– Inzestrarea armatei se va face numai daca producatorii vor realiza in proportie die minim 70% tehnica necesara in tara.

Cheltuieli (altele decat investitii si salarii):

-Bugetul sa mentina doar cheltuielile legate de salarii, intretinerea curenta a sediilor si consumabilele.
– Asistenta sociala sa fie asigurata dintr-un singur fond, punctual (cu ancheta sociala).
– Compensarea medicamentelor subventionate cu impozitele datorate de farmacii.
– Plata serviciilor medicale per procedura, nu per numar de paturi. Penalizarea unitatii spitalicesti pentru erorile medicale cu de zece ori valoarea procedurilor.
-Anularea tuturor cheltuielilor cu carburanti, autoturisme, telefoane mobile, cu exceptia salvarii, politiei, pompierilor, etc..
– Anularea contractelor de paza si reorientarea acestora catre Jandarmerie.

Salarii bugetare:

– Diminuarea salariilor bugetare prin reducerea birocratiei si instituirea raspunderii personale. (Exemplu: Autorizatia de construire sa devina o Notificare de Construire din partea investitorului, in acord cu Certificatul de urbanism. Primaria doar sa inregistreze notificarea, urmand apoi sa verifice de-adevaratelea conformitatea constructiei cu regulamentul) Inlocuirea tutoror avizelor, acordurilor si autorizatiilor eliberate de autoritatile publice, centrale sau locale cu declaratii pe propria raspundere a celor interesati. Verificarea ulterioara a conformitatii declaratiilor.
– Anularea sporurilor de vechime.
– Marirea sporurilor de competenta (grade pentru profesori, medici)
– Anularea functiilor intermediare (sefi de servicii, directorasi) sau a celor inutile (Politia a fost demilitarizata, dar s-au mentinut gradele: Politistii trebuie sa fie agenti sau comisari, chestorul, de exemplu, este seful Politiei, nu un grad pe care cineva de treaba il primeste). Functiile sa fie temporare si legate de competenta lucratorilor.
– ocuparea unor anumite pozitii din administratie prin alegeri interne.
– Desfiintarea institutiilor paralele (directii agricole, prefecturi) sau complementare (politie feroviara, politie de frontiera, politie obisnuita…) Unificarea ANAF, ANI, Garzii financiare.
– Scoaterea procuraturii din randul magistratilor si asimilarea lor cu vocti ai statului. Excluderea acestora din serviciul public pentru pierderea procesolor pe vicii de procedura, netrimiterea in instanta a cazurilor, etc) Numirea sefilor politiei de catre primari (unde e cazul) sau presedintii de consilii judetene. Alegerea procurorilor sefi de catre barouri.

Combaterea evaziunii fiscale:

– Introducerea deductibilitatii cheltuielilor pentru alimentatie, sanatate, invatamant, asigurarea locuintei. Realizarea unui sistem electronic de emitere si deducere a facturilor.
– Demiterea

Impozite si taxe:

TVA
impozitul pe profit si pe dividende
contributii sociale si de sanatate
taxe pe proprietati (auto, imobiliare)

In cazul in care bugetul nu ar fi echilibrat s-ar putea mari TVA-ul daca s-ar micsora contributiile legate de salarii. Nu uitati ca ar fi in paralel cu introducerea deductibilitatii unor importante cheltuieli.

Citeste la Dreapta!

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Florin Citu

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Sociollogica

"Istoria ne legitimeaza ca singurele partide autentice de centru-dreapta", Crin Antonescu

Carl Schmitt Studien

"Istoria ne legitimeaza ca singurele partide autentice de centru-dreapta", Crin Antonescu

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