FRANȚA – A CĂZUT GUVERNUL

Analiza publicata pe blogul „stelian-tanase.ro„.

FRANȚA – NICI LA DREAPTA, NICI LA STÂNGA

Analiza publicata pe blogul „stelian-tanase.ro”

PREȘEDINTELE FRANȚEI ÎNDRĂGOSTIT

Analiza publicata pe blogul „stelian-tanase.ro”.

Franta danseaza pe un butoi de pulbere. Cosmarul stangii socialiste, speranta dreptei conservatoare

Franta danseaza pe un vulcan aflat in fierbere. Grande Nation parcurge o perioda de recesiune si o criza sociala profunda. Acestor probleme structurale se adauga proiectul socialist de a distruge familia traditionala, promovand „polifamilia” si casatoria gay. La urne poporul suveran a sanctionat dur experimentele socialiste.

Partidul Socialist a pierdut toate alegerile parlamentare anticipate. Conservatorii francezi au castigat toate alegerile anticipate, atat in mediul rural, cat si in mediu urban, dar si in fiefurile socialiste ale diasporei franceze.

Se anunta o vara fierbinte si o campanie electorala si mai fierbinte. Miza acestor framintari sunt alegerile locale din 9/16 martie 2014. In cazul in care Uniunea pentru Majoritate Populara castiga alegerile municipale, experimentul socialist va fi aruncat la cosul de gunoi al istoriei. Franta nu experimenteaza pentru prima oara proiecte sociale de avantgarda.

In trecut in Franta s-au experimentat urmatoarele proiecte social-politice: lovitura de stat, puciul de palat, revolutia populara, regimul terorii, transformarea votului popular in tribunal popular, comuna revolutionar-comunista si revolutia anarhista. Toate aceste experimente au esuat. Si finalul acestor experimente a soldat intr-un bumerang electoral al dreptei.

Sa trecem in revista succesurile conservatoare si esescurile socialiste:

9/16.12.2012, Sixième circonscription de l’Hérault – colegiu electoral castigat de UMP = 61.91%

9/16.12.2012, Première circonscription du Val-de-Marne – colegiu electoral castigat de UMP = 56,55%

9/16.12.2012, Treizième circonscription des Hauts-de-Seine – colegiu electoral castigat de UMP = 60,03%

17/24.03.2013, Deuxième circonscription de l’Oise – colegiu electoral castigat de UMP = 51,41%

17/24.03. 2013, Circonscription de Wallis et Futuna – colegiu electoral castigat de candidatul independent de dreapta = 37,51%

25.05./08.06.2013, Première circonscription des Français établis hors de France (SUA + Canada) – colegiu electoral castigat de UMP = 53,72%

23.05./09.06. 2013, Huitième circonscription des Français établis hors de France (Italia, Grecia, Cipru, Malta, Turcia) colegiu electoral castigat de formatiunea liberala UDI (53,36%). In acest colegiul balotajul s-a disputat intre formatiunile de dreapta UMP si UDI.

16/23.06.2013, Troisième circonscription de Lot-et-Garonne – Balotaj castigat de UMP cu 53,76%.

Experimentul socialist francez cuprinde doua mari obiective: suprataxarea clasei antreprenoriale si distrugerea sistematica a familiei traditionale. Falansterul socialist Hollande este un esec total. Antreprenorii si-au mutat afacerile in Marea Britanie sau Belgia. Impunea casatoriei gay este sanctionat dur la urne. Partidul Socialist a pierdut toate cele opt alegerile parlamentare anticipate. Regimul Hollande detine o majoritate subtire de 52,86% in Camera Deputatilor, iar la Senat factiunea guvernamentala socialista se afla in opozitie.

Partidul Stangii Radicale PdG a parasit in ianuarie guvernul socialist si se opune vehement lui Hollande. Stanga radicala si dreapta conservatoare se pregatesc pentru alegerile locale din 9/16 martie 2014. Astfel Franta intra intr-un an electoral electoral crucial. Daca dreapta conservatoare castiga alegerile municipale din martie 2014, atunci va putea bloca si tergiversa la nivel local orice lege aprobata de majoritatea socialista. In mai 2014 electoratul francez va fi chemat din nou la urne, de aceasta data se vor vota europarlamentarii francezi.

In acest context dreapta conservatoare poate obtine o noua victorie. Astfel regimul Hollande navigheza spre un viitor incert. Si in orice moment nemultumirea se poate transforma intr-un butoi de pulbere care asteapta sa fie aprins. O explozie sociala in Franta va afecta in mod direct toata Europa. Nu este pentru prima oare unde Franta decide soarta Europei.

Raportul de forte intre stanga socialista si dreapta convervatoare este urmatorul:

Stanga

Partidul Socialist PS = 274 deputati, 47,49% (din 577)/128 senatori, 36,77% (din 348)

Dreapta

Uniunea pentru o majoritate populara UMP = 199 deputati, 34,49% (din 577)/131 senatori, 37,68% (din 348)

Alegeri parlamentare Franta – 17 iunie 2012, turul secund – update 18.06.2012

Alegeri parlamentare, rezultate finale:

Partidul Socialist Francez PS, primul tur: 29,35% VVE, 22 MO + turul secund: 40,82% VVE, 250 MO = 272 mandate (47,31%)
Diverse formatiuni de stanga DVG, primul tur: 3,40% VVE, 1 MO + turul secund: 3,11% VVE, 21 MO = 22 mandate (3,81%)
Federatia Europa Ecologista EELV, primul tur: 5,46% VVE, 1 MO + turul secund: 3,61% VVE, 15 MO = 16 mandate (2,77%)
Partidul Radical de Stanga PRG, primul tur: 1,65% VVE, 1 MO + turul secund: 2,36% VVE, 12 MO = 13 mandate (2,08%)
Federatia de Stanga FDG, primul tur: 6,91% VVE + turul secund: 1,09% VVE, 10 MO = 10 mandate (1,73%)

Total partide de stanga: primul tur: 46,77% VVE, 25 MO + 50,99% VVE, 308 MO = 333 mandate (57,70%)

Uniunea pentru Majoritate Populara UMP, primul tur: 27,19% VVE, 9 MO + turul secund: 37,08%, 182 MO = 191 mandate (33,10%)
Diverse formatiuni de dreapta DVD, primul tur: 3,51% VVE, 1 MO + turul secund: 1,83% VVE, 14 MO = 15 mandate (2,60%)
Noul Centru NC, primul tur: 2,20% VVE, 1 MO + turul secund: 2,49% VVE, 11 MO = 12 mandate (2,08%)
Partidul Radical, primul tur: 1,24% VVE, + turul secund: 1,36% VVE, 6 MO = 6 mandate (1,04%)

Total partide de dreapta: primul tur: 34,67% VVE, 11 MO + turul secund: 224 mandate (38,82%)

Frontul National FN, primul tur: 13,60% VVE + turul secund: 3,69% VVE, 2 MO = 2 mandate (0,35%)
Miscarea Democrata MoDem, primul tur: 1,76% VVE + turul secund: 0,50% VVE, 2 MO = 2 mandate (0,35%)
Regionalisti, primul tur: 0,56% VVE + turul secund: 0,59% VVE, 2 MO = 2 mandate (0,35%)
Extrema dreapta, primul tur: 0,19% VVE + turul secund: 0,13% VVE, 1 MO = 1 mandat (0,17%)

Jurnal de campanie (21) – Alegeri anticipate in Renania de Nordwestfalia

Alegeri regionale anticipate  in landul Schleswig-Holstein, rezultate finale:

Uniunea Crestindemocrata CDU 30,8o% (22 mandate)
Partidul Socialdemocrat SPD 30,40% (22 mandate)
Miscarea Ecologista GRU 13,20% (10 mandate)
Partidul Liber Democrat FDP 8,20% (6 mandate)
Partidul Piratilor PIR 8,20% (6 mandate)
Partidul Minoritatii Daneze SSW 4,60% (3 mandate)
Noua Stanga Linke 2,2%,
Alte partide 2,4%

Alegeri parlamentare Grecia, rezultate finale

ND (conservatori) 18,85% (108 mandate)
Alianta Populara de Stanga SYRIZA (social-ecologisti) 16,78% (52 mandate)
PASOK (socialdemocrati) 13,18% (41 mandate)
Grecii Independenti ANEL (national-conservatori) 10,60% (33 mandate)
KKE (Partidul Comunist) 8,48% (26 mandate)
Aurora de Aur (neofascisti) 6,97% (21 mandate)
Stanga Democrata DIMAR 6,10% (19 mandate)
Miscarea Ecologista 2,93%
LAOS (nationalisti) 2,90%

Alegeri prezidentiale Franta, rezultate finale:

Hollande 51,68%
Sarkozy 48,32%

Sursa: Election Politique

Publicat în alegeri anticipate in landul Renania de Nordwestfalia, alegeri parlamentare 2012, alegeri parlamentare anticipate, alegeri parlamentare anticipate 2012, alegeri prezidentiale Franta 2012, anul electoral 2012, Batalia pentru Berlin, cetateni romani stabiliti in Germania, Charles de Gaulle, Christian Lindner, Clubul Liberal din Koeln, Comunitatea romanilor din Franta, comunitatea romanilor din Germania, comunitatea Romanilor din Renania de Nordwestfalia, DAS ist meine FDP, DISY Dimokratiki Symmachia (Alianta Democrata, falimentul Greciei, FDP, FDP Liberté, FDP NRW, Franta, Freiheit oder Sozialismus, Freiheit und Verantwortung!, Gabriel Savulescu Candidat al Partidului Liber Democrat, Germania, Grecia, KKE, KKE Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas (Partidul Comunist Elen), LAOS Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós (Regruparea Populara Orthodoxa), Liberalism, ND Néa Dimokratía (Noua Democratie, Noua Stanga, OP Oikologoi Prasinoi (Miscarea Ecologista), Opozitie vs Putere, Partidul "Noua Stanga", Partidul Liber Democrat FDP, Partidul Liberal, Partidul Liberal din Germania FDP, Renania de Nordwestfalia, Romani in Germania, Sarkozy, studenti romani imatriculati in Germania, SYRIZA Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás (Coalitia Stangii Radicale), Unterschriftenaktion: Ja zu einer Abschaffung der Praxisgebühr, vot prin corespondenta, voturi valabil exprimate, XA Chrysi Avyi XA ("Aurora de Aur". Etichete: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , . Leave a Comment »

Anul electoral 2012: Alegerile prezidentiale din Franta – update 23.04.2012

Participare la vot, turul I, 22.04.2012:

70,59%, orele 17.00.

Alegeri prezidentiale, Franta, rezultate finale, turul I.

Hollande 28,63% (PS)
Sarkozy 27,20% (UMP)
Le Pen 17,09% (FN)
Mélénchon 11,14% (FdG)
Bayrou 9,10% (MoDem)
Joly 2,3% (Ecolo)

Sursa: Election – Politique – Citoyen

Rezultate detaliate

Rezultate finale, turul I.

Sondaje electorale – alegeri prezidentiale

Candidat Hollande (PS) Sarkozy (UMP) Le Pen (FN) Bayrou (MoDem)
Institut TNS Sofres 13.03.2012 30% 26% 16% 11,50%
IFOP 13.03.2012 29% 27% 16% 13,00%

Sursa informationala: Election Politique Citoyen

Anul electoral 2012 incepe in forta. 2012 este marcat de alegerile prezidentiale si parlamentare din Franta. In pole-position se afla candidatul socialist Hollande (27%), secondat de actualul presedinte Sarkozy (24%). Locul 3 este ocupat de Marine Le Pen (17%).

In Franta sistemul politic este bipolar. Daca esti anti-Sarkozy esti automat de stanga.

Stanga franceza cuprinde toate formatiuniile non-gaulliste: comunisti, trozkisti, anarhisti, civici, centristi, socialisti, noua stanga, socialdemocrati.

Dreapta franceza cuprinde toate formatiuniile non-socialiste: liberali, conservatori, crestinidemocrati, gaullisti. Al doilea mandat al lui Sarkozy va fi cu totul diferit fata de cel prezent.Sarkozy va incerca sa intre in istorie promovand proiecte culturale, academice si desigur paneuropene.

Mai jos vizionati un clip al secretarului-general al Uniunii pentru o MajoritatePopulara UMP Jean-Francois Copé.

Progression des dons, progression des adhésions (261 000 au 31 décembre 2011), mobilisation, organisation et professionnalisation de l’UMP.

Plus d’informations sur http://www.u-m-p.org

Platforma electorala UMP: „Synthèse du Projet 2012

Lista celor 55 de candidati prezidentiali

Calendar electoral:

Alegeri prezidentiale:

22.04.2012 – turul I

06.05.2012 – turul II

07-10.05.2012 – depunerea juramintului noului presedinte

10.06.2012 – alegeri parlamentare – turul I

17.06.2012 – alegeri parlamentare – turul II

09.07.2012 – reuniunea noului legislativ

14.07.2012 – Ziua nationala a Frantei

Stratfor.com: „Europe’s Crisis: Beyond Finance”

Autor: George Friedman

Sursa informationala: Stratfor.com

Everyone is wondering about the next disaster to befall Europe. Italy is one focus; Spain is also a possibility. But these crises are already under way. Instead, the next crisis will be political, not in the sense of what conventional politician is going to become prime minister, but in the deeper sense of whether Europe’s political elite can retain power, or whether new political forces are going to emerge that will completely reshape the European political landscape. If this happens, it will be by far the most important consequence of the European financial crisis.

Thus far we have seen some changes in personalities in the countries at the center of the crisis. In Greece, Prime Minister George Papandreou stepped aside, while in Italy Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi now has resigned. Though these resignations have represented a formal change of government, they have not represented a formal policy change. In fact, Papandreou and Berlusconi both stepped down on the condition that their respective governments adopt the austerity policies proposed during their respective tenures.

Europeanists dominate the coalitions that have replaced them. They come from the generation and class that are deeply intellectually and emotionally committed to the idea of Europe. For them, the European Union is not merely a useful tool for achieving national goals. Rather, it is an alternative to nationalism and the horrors that nationalism has brought to Europe. It is a vision of a single Continent drawn together in a common enterprise — prosperity — that abolishes the dangers of a European war, creates a cooperative economic project and, least discussed but not trivial, returns Europe to its rightful place at the heart of the international political system.

For the generation of leadership born just after World War II that came to political maturity in the last 20 years, the European project was an ideological given and an institutional reality. These leaders formed an international web of European leaders who for the most part all shared this vision. This leadership extended beyond the political sphere: Most European elites were committed to Europe (there were, of course, exceptions).

Greece and the Struggle of the European Elite

Now we are seeing this elite struggle to preserve its vision. When Papandreou called for a referendum on austerity, the European elite put tremendous pressure on him to abandon his initiative. Given the importance of the austerity agreements to the future of Greece, the idea of a referendum made perfect sense. A referendum would allow the Greek government to claim its actions enjoyed the support of the majority of the Greek people. Obviously, it is not clear that the Greeks would have approved the agreement.

Led by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the European elite did everything possible to prevent such an outcome. This included blocking the next tranche of bailout money and suspending all further bailout money until Greek politicians could commit to all previously negotiated austerity measures. European outrage at the idea of a Greek referendum makes perfect sense.

Coming under pressure from Greece and the European elite, Papandreou resigned and was replaced by a former vice president of the European Central Bank. Already abandoned by Papandreou, the idea of a referendum disappeared.

Two dimensions explain this outcome. The first was national. The common perception in the financial press is that Greece irresponsibly borrowed money to support extravagant social programs and then could not pay off the loans. But there also is validity to the Greek point of view. From this perspective, under financial pressure, the European Union was revealed as a mechanism for Germany to surge exports into developing EU countries via the union’s free trade system. Germany also used Brussels’ regulations and managed the euro such that Greece found itself in an impossible situation. Germany then called on Athens to impose austerity on the Greek people to save irresponsible financiers who, knowing perfectly well what Greece’s economic position was, were eager to lend money to the Greeks. Each version of events has some truth to it, but the debate ultimately was between the European and Greek elites. It was an internal dispute, and whether for Greece’s benefit or for the European financial system’s benefit, both sides were committed to finding a solution.

The second dimension had to do with the Greek public and the Greek and European elites. The Greek elite clearly benefited financially from the European Union. The Greek public, by contrast, had a mixed experience. Certainly, the 20 years of prosperity since the 1990s benefited many — but not all. Economic integration left the Greek economy wide open for other Europeans to enter, putting segments of the Greek economy at a terrific disadvantage. European competitors overwhelmed workers in many industries along with small-business owners in particular. So there always was an argument in Greece for opposing the European Union. The stark choice posed by the current situation strengthened this argument, namely, who would bear the burden of the European system’s dysfunction in Greece? In other words, assuming the European Union was to be saved, who would absorb the cost? The bailouts promised by Germany on behalf of Europe would allow the Greeks to stabilize their financial system and repay at least some of their loans to Europe. This would leave the Greek elite generally intact. The price to Greece would be austerity, but the Greek elite would not pay that price. Members of the broader public — who would lose jobs, pensions, salaries and careers — would.

Essentially, the first question was whether Greece as a nation would deliberately default on its debts — as many corporations do — and force a restructuring on its terms regardless of what the European financial system needed, or whether it would seek to accommodate the European system. The second was whether it would structure an accommodation in Europe such that the burden would not fall on the public but on the Greek elite.

The Greek government chose to seek accommodation with European needs and to allow the major impact of austerity to fall on the public as a consequence of the elite’s interests in Europe — now deep and abiding — and the ideology of Europeanism. Since by its very nature the burden of austerity would fall on the public, it was vital a referendum not be held. Even so, the Greeks undoubtedly would seek to evade the harshest dimensions of austerity. That is the social contract in Greece: The Greeks would promise the Europeans what they wanted, but they would protect the public via duplicity. While that approach might work in Greece, it cannot work in a country like Italy, whose exposure is too large to hide via duplicity. Similarly, duplicity cannot be the ultimate solution to the European crisis.

The Real European Crisis

And here we come to the real European crisis. Given the nature of the crisis, which we have seen play out in Greece, the European elite can save the European concept and their own interests only by transferring the cost to the broader public, and not simply among debtors. Creditors like Germany, too, must absorb the cost and distribute it to the public. German banks simply cannot manage to absorb the losses. Like the French, they will have to be recapitalized, meaning the cost will fall to the public.

Europe was not supposed to work this way. Like Immanuel Kant’s notion of a “Perpetual Peace,” the European Union promised eternal prosperity. That plus preventing war were Europe’s great promises; there was no moral project beyond these. Failure to deliver on either promise undermines the European project’s legitimacy. If the price of retaining Europe is a massive decline in Europeans’ standard of living, then the argument for retaining the European Union is weakened.

As important, if Europe is perceived as failing because the European elite failed, and the European elite is perceived as defending the European idea as a means of preserving its own interests and position, then the public’s commitment to the European idea — never as robust as the elite’s commitment — is put in doubt. The belief in Europe that the crisis can be managed within current EU structures has been widespread. The Germans, however, have floated a proposal that would give creditors in Europe — i.e., the Germans — the power to oversee debtors’ economic decisions. This would undermine sovereignty dramatically. Losing sovereignty for greater prosperity would work in Europe. Losing it to pay back the debts of Europe’s banks is a much harder sell.

The Immigrant Factor and Upcoming Elections

All of this comes at a time of anti-immigrant, particularly anti-Muslim, feeling among the European public. In some countries, anger increasingly has been directed at the European Union and its borders policies — and at European countries’ respective national and international elites, who have used immigration to fuel the economy while creating both economic and cultural tensions in the native population. Thus, immigration has become linked to general perceptions of the European Union, opening both a fundamental economic and cultural divide between European elites and the public.

Racial and ethnic tensions combined with economic austerity and a sense of betrayal toward the elite creates an explosive mixture. Europe experienced this during the inter-war period, though this is not a purely European phenomenon. Disappointment in one’s personal life combined with a feeling of cultural disenfranchisement by outsiders and the sense that the elite is neither honest, nor competent nor committed to the well-being of its own public tends to generate major political reactions anywhere in the world.

Europe has avoided an explosion thus far. But the warning signs are there. Anti-European and anti-immigrant factions existed even during the period when the European Union was functioning, with far-right parties polling up to 16 percent in France. It is not clear that the current crisis has strengthened these elements, but how much this crisis will cost the European public and the absence of miraculous solutions also have not yet become clear. As Italy confronts its crisis, the cost — and the inevitably of the cost — will become clearer.

A large number of elections are scheduled or expected in Europe in 2012 and 2013, including a French presidential election in 2012 and German parliamentary elections in 2013. At the moment, these appear set to be contests between the conventional parties that have dominated Europe since World War II in the West and since 1989 in the East. In general, these are the parties of the elite, all more or less buying into Europe. But anti-European factions have emerged within some of these parties, and as sentiment builds, new parties may form and anti-European factions within existing parties may grow. A crisis of this magnitude cannot happen without Tea Party- and Occupy Wall Street-type factions emerging. In Europe, however — where in addition to economics the crisis is about race, sovereignty, national self-determination and the moral foundations of the European Union — these elements will be broader and more intense.

Populist sentiment coupled with racial and cultural concerns is the classic foundation for right-wing nationalist parties. The European left in general is part of the pro-European elite. Apart from small fragments, very little of the left hasn’t bought into Europe. It is the right that has earned a meaningful following by warning about Europe over the past 20 years. It thus would seem reasonable to expect that these factions will become much stronger as the price of the crisis — and who is going to bear it — becomes apparent.

The real question, therefore, is not how the financial crisis works out. It is whether the European project will survive. And that depends on whether the European elite can retain its legitimacy. That legitimacy is not gone by any means, but it is in the process of being tested like never before, and it is difficult to see how the elite retains it. The polls don’t show the trend yet because the magnitude of the impact on individual lives has not manifested itself in most of Europe. When it does show itself, there will be a massive recalculation regarding the worth and standing of the European elite. There will be calls for revenge, and vows of never allowing such a thing to recur.

Regardless of whether the next immediate European crisis is focused on Spain or Italy, it follows that by mid-decade, Europe’s political landscape will have shifted dramatically, with new parties, personalities and values emerging. The United States shares much of this trend, but its institutions are not newly invented. Old and not working creates problems; new and not working is dangerous. Why the United States will take a different path is a subject for another time. Suffice it to say that the magnitude of Europe’s problems goes well beyond finance.

The European crisis is one of sovereignty, cultural identity and the legitimacy of the elite. The financial crisis has several outcomes, all bad. Regardless of which is chosen, the impact on the political system will be dramatic.

Scrisoare catre Consiliul Superior al Audiovizualului din Franta

Strasbourg, 14 septembrie 2011 – Am trimis in aceasta dimineata o scrisoare catre presedintele Consiliului Superior al Audiovizualului (CSA) din Franta, Michel Boyon, in legatura cu emisiunea „Les Guignols de l’Info”, difuzata in data de 6 septembrie 2011 de televiziunea Canal +. Regasiti mai jos traducerea in limba romana a scrisorii, precum si scrisoarea originala (in limba franceza).

Autor: Renate Weber, MEP

–––––––––––

In atentia d-lui Michel Boyon, Presedintele Consiliului Superior al Audiovizualului (CSA), Franta

                 

                                    

Stimate domnule Presedinte Boyon,

Stimate doamne si stimati domni membri ai Consiliului Superior al Audiovizualului,

 

 

Va scriu in calitate de cetatean roman,  de persoana care toata viata ei a crezut in libertatea de exprimare si in libertatea presei si a luptat ca acestea sa fie respectate. Am facut acest lucru ca avocat de drepturile omului, lucrand cu numeroase organizatii neguvernamentale din Romania sau internationale, ca profesoara, cand am predat  drept constitutional si dreptul international al drepturilor omului, il fac si acum, din pozitia de deputata in Parlamentul European.

 

Va scriu in legatura cu emisiunea „Les Guignols de l’Info”, difuzata in data de 6 septembrie 2011 de televiziunea Canal +, in cadrul careia, satirizand doi foarte binecunoscuti cronicari sportivi francezi, au existat urmatoarele referiri la cetatenii romani:

 

  1. “…Sa vorbim de romani, atunci…cand arbitrul va arunca moneda in aer, nu e sigur ca o sa cada pe jos cu atatia romani in preajma …”
  2. “…sportul national in Romania, se stie bine, nu e fotbalul, este cersetoria …”
  3. “…cu romanii trebuie sa ai grija sa nu intri in contact! …au paduchi. Orice ai zice, orice ai face, romanii nu sunt prieteni cu spalatul…”

 

Fara doar si poate, libertatea de exprimare si libertatea presei inseamna, printre altele, sa poti sa-i  ridiculizezi pe cei care au un discurs rasist sau xenofob. Este dreptul fiecarei persoane si al fiecarui jurnalist sa aleaga forma prin care doreste sa se raporteze critic la adresa unui asemenea discurs, iar satira poate reprezenta o forma de sanctiune.

 

In acelasi timp, nu pot sa nu observ ca referirile din aceasta satira nu au vizat persoane individuale, asa cum se intampla in imensa majoritate a cazurilor din aceasta emisiune, ele nu au vizat nici politicieni, nici fotbalisti, nici alte persoane publice din Romania, ci o intreaga natiune.

 

Asa ca va intreb : care sunt, totusi, limitele libertatii de exprimare?

 

Sigur, oamenii publici, politicieni sau alte categorii, in virtutea statutului lor de persoane publice, trebuie sa suporte o critica mult mai severa la adresa lor, uneori chiar exagerari sau afirmatii injuste. Pentru ca si-au asumat acest statut public. Cei care alcatuiesc insa o comunitate umana, o natiune, nu au facut nici o optiune in acest sens. Tocmai de aceea, referirile „in bloc”, atunci cand este vizata si insultata intreaga comunitate, sunt considerate rasiste de legislatia europeana si internationala.

 

Stim cu totii ca afirmatiile facute, chiar in cadrul unei satire, raman gravate in memoria publica. O adaptare a celebrei „calomniez, calomniez, quelque chose en restera”.

 

Cunosc bine jurisprudenta Curtii Europene a Drepturilor Omului si nu cred ca ceva din aceasta jurisprudenta poate fi invocat in apararea afirmatiilor celor de la „Les Guignols”. Nici macar cauza Jersild impotriva Danemarcei nu poate fi invocata pentru ca, in opinia mea, nu se poate face o paralela intre acest caz si satira la care m-am referit.

 

Nu va solicit sa sanctionati nici postul de televiziune, nici realizatorii, nici jurnalistii, dar mi se pare firesc sa pun in dezbatere afirmatii care nu se refera la o persoana individuala, ci la o intreaga comunitate, chiar la o natiune, si care, in acest fel, perpetueaza prejudecatile, aversiunile, denigrarile, discriminarile in ce-i priveste pe romani. Si in acest sens, presa are o responsabilitate la fel de mare ca a politicienilor.

 

Consider, prin urmare, ca este de datoria Consiliului Superior al Audiovizualului sa reactioneze, atat pentru ca are acest mandat, cat si pentru ca nu este pentru prima data cand astfel de manifestari denigratoare si rasiste la adresa poporului roman sunt difuzate pe un post de televiziune francez[1].

 

Contez, prin urmare, pe faptul ca acest caz va fi luat in discutie de CSA si va rog sa ma tineti la curent cu rezolutia dumneavoastra.

 

Cu stima,

 

Renate Weber, ALDE

Membra a Parlamentului European

 

[1] La televiziunea France 2, in 2010, umoristul Jonathan Lambert a executat ceea ce el a numit „salutul romanesc” – palma intinsa in fata pentru cersit: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EG2jPJCiZlM&feature=related

 

––––––––––––-

A l’attention de Monsieur Michel  Boyon,

Président du Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel (CSA), France

                                                    

 

Cher Monsieur le Président, Michel Boyon,

Chères Dames et Chers Monsieurs membres du Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel

 

Je vous écris en qualité de citoyen roumain, de personne qui pendent toute sa vie a cru en la liberté d’expression et celle de la presse et qui a toujours lutté pour qu’elles soient respectés. Je l’ai fait en tant que avocat de droits de l’homme, en travaillent avec des nombreuses organisations non-gouvernementales roumaines et internationales, je l’ai fait en tant que professeure, quand j’ai enseigné le droit constitutionnel et le droit international de droits de l’homme et je le fait maintenant aussi, en tant que députée dans le Parlement Européen.

 

Je vous écris a propos de l’émission “Les Guignols de l’Info”, diffusé le soir du 6 septembre 2011 par la chaine Canal+, et pendent la quelle, en satirisent deux très connus présentateurs sportifs français, y en eu les suivantes références aux citoyens roumains:

 

  1. “…Parlons des roumains alors: …quand l’arbitre va lancer la pièce en l’air, c’est pas sur qu’elle retombe par terre avec tous ces roumains dans le coin…”
  2. “…le sport national en Roumanie, c’est bien connu, c’est pas le football c’est la mendicité…”
  3. “…avec les Roumains, faut se méfier du contact! …ils ont des poux. On aura beau dire, on aura beau faire mais le roumain n’est pas à la minute avec la douche…”

 

Sans doute, la liberté d’expression et celle de la presse signifient, parmi d’autres, pouvoir ridiculiser ceux qui ont un discours raciste ou xénophobe. C’est le droit de chaque personne et de chaque journaliste de choisir la forme par la quelle il souhaite se rapporter d’une manière critique à un tel discours et, bien évidement, la satire peut représenter une forme de sanctionne.

 

Au même temps, je peux pas m’empêcher d’observer que les références critiques de cette satire n’ont pas visé des personnes individuelles (comme dans la grande majorité des cas de cette émission), elles ont visé non plus des politiciens, ou des footballeurs ou d’autres personnes roumaines, au caractère publique, mais bien toute une nation.

 

Donc, je me permets de vous demander: quelles sont, quand même, les limites de la liberté d’expression?

 

Evidemment, les personnes publiques, politiciens ou autres catégories, vu leur statut de personnes publiques, doivent supporter une critique beaucoup plus sévère à leur égard, parfois même des exagérations ou des affirmations moins justes. Eux, ils ont assumé ce statut public.

 

Ceux qui constituent, par contre, une communauté humaine, une nation, n’ont fait aucune option dans ce sens la. C’est exactement pour celle la que les références généralisés, quand tout une nation est prise pour cible et insulté, sont considérés par la législation européenne et internationale comme racistes.

 

On le sait bien : ce genre d’affirmations, même au cadre d’une satire, restent gravés à jamais dans la mémoire du public. Une adaptation du célèbre : „calomniez, calomniez, quelque chose en restera”.

 

Je connais bien la jurisprudence de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme et je ne pense pas que les réalisateurs des «Guignols de l’info » peuvent l’invoquer pour défendre leurs affirmations. Même pas l’affaire Jersild c. Danemark ne peut pas être invoqué pars ce que, dans mon opinion, on ne peut pas faire une parallèle entre les deux.

 

Je ne vous sollicite pas de sanctionner la chaine, non plus les réalisateurs ou les journalistes, mais ça me paraît normal de vouloir débattre des affirmations qui visent pas une personne mais toute une nation et qui, au même temps, ne font autre que perpétuer les préjugées, les aversions, les dénigrassions et les discriminations envers les roumains. Et içi la presse a une responsabilité autant grande que les politiciens.

 

Je considère donc que c’est du devoir du Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel d’enfin réagir, puisque ça fait partir de son mandat et aussi parce que c’est n’est pas la première fois qu’une chaine de télévision française[1] propage des références racistes et dénégatoires à l’encontre des roumains et du peuple roumain.

 

Je compte sur le fait que ce cas va être discuté par le CSA et je vous en prie de me tenir au courent de votre résolution.

 

Bien à vous,

 

Renate Weber, ALDE

Membre du Parlement Européen

 

 

[1] France 2, en 2010, quand Jonathan Lambert a fait ce qu’il a présenté comme „le salut roumain” – c’est a dire la mendicité http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EG2jPJCiZlM&feature=related

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