Lista sectiilor de votare

Sursa informationala: DA!VOTEZ

Harta interactiva – Sectii de vot din Strainatate

Autoritatea Electorala Permanenta ne pune la dispozitie lista sectiilor de votare pentru Referendumul de pe 29 Iulie 2012.

Accesand linkul de mai jos puteti vedea, pe zone, sectiile de votare organizate pentru ca dumneavoastra sa puteti vota, oriunde v-ati afla. Dupa cum stiti, pentru referendumul din 29 iule puteti vota chiar daca sunteti departe de adresa dumneavoastra din buletin. Trebuie doar sa localizati sectia de votare din zona in care va veti afla pe 29 iulie si sa mergeti sa votati acolo, intre orele 7.00 si 23.00, ora locala.

Pentru sectiile de votare din strainatate vom actualiza lista, introducand adresele exacte ale sectiilor de votare dedicate.

Multumim.

http://www.roaep.ro/ro/section.php?id=25&l2=48&ids=119&an=2012

18.292.514 cetăţeni români au drept de vot la referendumul din 29 iulie.

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Jurnal de campanie (21) – Alegeri anticipate in Renania de Nordwestfalia

Alegeri regionale anticipate  in landul Schleswig-Holstein, rezultate finale:

Uniunea Crestindemocrata CDU 30,8o% (22 mandate)
Partidul Socialdemocrat SPD 30,40% (22 mandate)
Miscarea Ecologista GRU 13,20% (10 mandate)
Partidul Liber Democrat FDP 8,20% (6 mandate)
Partidul Piratilor PIR 8,20% (6 mandate)
Partidul Minoritatii Daneze SSW 4,60% (3 mandate)
Noua Stanga Linke 2,2%,
Alte partide 2,4%

Alegeri parlamentare Grecia, rezultate finale

ND (conservatori) 18,85% (108 mandate)
Alianta Populara de Stanga SYRIZA (social-ecologisti) 16,78% (52 mandate)
PASOK (socialdemocrati) 13,18% (41 mandate)
Grecii Independenti ANEL (national-conservatori) 10,60% (33 mandate)
KKE (Partidul Comunist) 8,48% (26 mandate)
Aurora de Aur (neofascisti) 6,97% (21 mandate)
Stanga Democrata DIMAR 6,10% (19 mandate)
Miscarea Ecologista 2,93%
LAOS (nationalisti) 2,90%

Alegeri prezidentiale Franta, rezultate finale:

Hollande 51,68%
Sarkozy 48,32%

Sursa: Election Politique

Publicat în alegeri anticipate in landul Renania de Nordwestfalia, alegeri parlamentare 2012, alegeri parlamentare anticipate, alegeri parlamentare anticipate 2012, alegeri prezidentiale Franta 2012, anul electoral 2012, Batalia pentru Berlin, cetateni romani stabiliti in Germania, Charles de Gaulle, Christian Lindner, Clubul Liberal din Koeln, Comunitatea romanilor din Franta, comunitatea romanilor din Germania, comunitatea Romanilor din Renania de Nordwestfalia, DAS ist meine FDP, DISY Dimokratiki Symmachia (Alianta Democrata, falimentul Greciei, FDP, FDP Liberté, FDP NRW, Franta, Freiheit oder Sozialismus, Freiheit und Verantwortung!, Gabriel Savulescu Candidat al Partidului Liber Democrat, Germania, Grecia, KKE, KKE Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas (Partidul Comunist Elen), LAOS Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós (Regruparea Populara Orthodoxa), Liberalism, ND Néa Dimokratía (Noua Democratie, Noua Stanga, OP Oikologoi Prasinoi (Miscarea Ecologista), Opozitie vs Putere, Partidul "Noua Stanga", Partidul Liber Democrat FDP, Partidul Liberal, Partidul Liberal din Germania FDP, Renania de Nordwestfalia, Romani in Germania, Sarkozy, studenti romani imatriculati in Germania, SYRIZA Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás (Coalitia Stangii Radicale), Unterschriftenaktion: Ja zu einer Abschaffung der Praxisgebühr, vot prin corespondenta, voturi valabil exprimate, XA Chrysi Avyi XA ("Aurora de Aur". Etichete: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , . Leave a Comment »

Grecia – alegeri parlamentare anticipate – update 14.03.2012

Partid PASOK ND  KKE  LAOS SYRIZA DIMAR OP DISY XA ANEL
11% 28% 11% 4% 12% 16% 4% 3,50% 4%

Sursa informationala: star.gr

PASOK Miscarea Socialista Panhellena
ND Néa Dimokratía (Noua Democratie, liberali-conservatori)
KKE Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas (Partidul Comunist Elen)
LAOS Laikós Orthódoxos Synagermós (Regruparea Populara Orthodoxa)
SYRIZA Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás (Coalitia Stangii Radicale)
DIMAR Dimokratiki Aristera (Stanga Democrata – Noua Stanga)
OP Oikologoi Prasinoi (Miscarea Ecologista)
DISY Dimokratiki Symmachia (Alianta Democrata, liberali)
XA Chrysi Avyi XA („Aurora de Aur”, neofascisti)
ANEL (Grecii Indenpendenti, nationali-conservatori)

Sursa informationala: star.gr

Stratfor.com: „Europe’s Crisis: Beyond Finance”

Autor: George Friedman

Sursa informationala: Stratfor.com

Everyone is wondering about the next disaster to befall Europe. Italy is one focus; Spain is also a possibility. But these crises are already under way. Instead, the next crisis will be political, not in the sense of what conventional politician is going to become prime minister, but in the deeper sense of whether Europe’s political elite can retain power, or whether new political forces are going to emerge that will completely reshape the European political landscape. If this happens, it will be by far the most important consequence of the European financial crisis.

Thus far we have seen some changes in personalities in the countries at the center of the crisis. In Greece, Prime Minister George Papandreou stepped aside, while in Italy Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi now has resigned. Though these resignations have represented a formal change of government, they have not represented a formal policy change. In fact, Papandreou and Berlusconi both stepped down on the condition that their respective governments adopt the austerity policies proposed during their respective tenures.

Europeanists dominate the coalitions that have replaced them. They come from the generation and class that are deeply intellectually and emotionally committed to the idea of Europe. For them, the European Union is not merely a useful tool for achieving national goals. Rather, it is an alternative to nationalism and the horrors that nationalism has brought to Europe. It is a vision of a single Continent drawn together in a common enterprise — prosperity — that abolishes the dangers of a European war, creates a cooperative economic project and, least discussed but not trivial, returns Europe to its rightful place at the heart of the international political system.

For the generation of leadership born just after World War II that came to political maturity in the last 20 years, the European project was an ideological given and an institutional reality. These leaders formed an international web of European leaders who for the most part all shared this vision. This leadership extended beyond the political sphere: Most European elites were committed to Europe (there were, of course, exceptions).

Greece and the Struggle of the European Elite

Now we are seeing this elite struggle to preserve its vision. When Papandreou called for a referendum on austerity, the European elite put tremendous pressure on him to abandon his initiative. Given the importance of the austerity agreements to the future of Greece, the idea of a referendum made perfect sense. A referendum would allow the Greek government to claim its actions enjoyed the support of the majority of the Greek people. Obviously, it is not clear that the Greeks would have approved the agreement.

Led by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the European elite did everything possible to prevent such an outcome. This included blocking the next tranche of bailout money and suspending all further bailout money until Greek politicians could commit to all previously negotiated austerity measures. European outrage at the idea of a Greek referendum makes perfect sense.

Coming under pressure from Greece and the European elite, Papandreou resigned and was replaced by a former vice president of the European Central Bank. Already abandoned by Papandreou, the idea of a referendum disappeared.

Two dimensions explain this outcome. The first was national. The common perception in the financial press is that Greece irresponsibly borrowed money to support extravagant social programs and then could not pay off the loans. But there also is validity to the Greek point of view. From this perspective, under financial pressure, the European Union was revealed as a mechanism for Germany to surge exports into developing EU countries via the union’s free trade system. Germany also used Brussels’ regulations and managed the euro such that Greece found itself in an impossible situation. Germany then called on Athens to impose austerity on the Greek people to save irresponsible financiers who, knowing perfectly well what Greece’s economic position was, were eager to lend money to the Greeks. Each version of events has some truth to it, but the debate ultimately was between the European and Greek elites. It was an internal dispute, and whether for Greece’s benefit or for the European financial system’s benefit, both sides were committed to finding a solution.

The second dimension had to do with the Greek public and the Greek and European elites. The Greek elite clearly benefited financially from the European Union. The Greek public, by contrast, had a mixed experience. Certainly, the 20 years of prosperity since the 1990s benefited many — but not all. Economic integration left the Greek economy wide open for other Europeans to enter, putting segments of the Greek economy at a terrific disadvantage. European competitors overwhelmed workers in many industries along with small-business owners in particular. So there always was an argument in Greece for opposing the European Union. The stark choice posed by the current situation strengthened this argument, namely, who would bear the burden of the European system’s dysfunction in Greece? In other words, assuming the European Union was to be saved, who would absorb the cost? The bailouts promised by Germany on behalf of Europe would allow the Greeks to stabilize their financial system and repay at least some of their loans to Europe. This would leave the Greek elite generally intact. The price to Greece would be austerity, but the Greek elite would not pay that price. Members of the broader public — who would lose jobs, pensions, salaries and careers — would.

Essentially, the first question was whether Greece as a nation would deliberately default on its debts — as many corporations do — and force a restructuring on its terms regardless of what the European financial system needed, or whether it would seek to accommodate the European system. The second was whether it would structure an accommodation in Europe such that the burden would not fall on the public but on the Greek elite.

The Greek government chose to seek accommodation with European needs and to allow the major impact of austerity to fall on the public as a consequence of the elite’s interests in Europe — now deep and abiding — and the ideology of Europeanism. Since by its very nature the burden of austerity would fall on the public, it was vital a referendum not be held. Even so, the Greeks undoubtedly would seek to evade the harshest dimensions of austerity. That is the social contract in Greece: The Greeks would promise the Europeans what they wanted, but they would protect the public via duplicity. While that approach might work in Greece, it cannot work in a country like Italy, whose exposure is too large to hide via duplicity. Similarly, duplicity cannot be the ultimate solution to the European crisis.

The Real European Crisis

And here we come to the real European crisis. Given the nature of the crisis, which we have seen play out in Greece, the European elite can save the European concept and their own interests only by transferring the cost to the broader public, and not simply among debtors. Creditors like Germany, too, must absorb the cost and distribute it to the public. German banks simply cannot manage to absorb the losses. Like the French, they will have to be recapitalized, meaning the cost will fall to the public.

Europe was not supposed to work this way. Like Immanuel Kant’s notion of a “Perpetual Peace,” the European Union promised eternal prosperity. That plus preventing war were Europe’s great promises; there was no moral project beyond these. Failure to deliver on either promise undermines the European project’s legitimacy. If the price of retaining Europe is a massive decline in Europeans’ standard of living, then the argument for retaining the European Union is weakened.

As important, if Europe is perceived as failing because the European elite failed, and the European elite is perceived as defending the European idea as a means of preserving its own interests and position, then the public’s commitment to the European idea — never as robust as the elite’s commitment — is put in doubt. The belief in Europe that the crisis can be managed within current EU structures has been widespread. The Germans, however, have floated a proposal that would give creditors in Europe — i.e., the Germans — the power to oversee debtors’ economic decisions. This would undermine sovereignty dramatically. Losing sovereignty for greater prosperity would work in Europe. Losing it to pay back the debts of Europe’s banks is a much harder sell.

The Immigrant Factor and Upcoming Elections

All of this comes at a time of anti-immigrant, particularly anti-Muslim, feeling among the European public. In some countries, anger increasingly has been directed at the European Union and its borders policies — and at European countries’ respective national and international elites, who have used immigration to fuel the economy while creating both economic and cultural tensions in the native population. Thus, immigration has become linked to general perceptions of the European Union, opening both a fundamental economic and cultural divide between European elites and the public.

Racial and ethnic tensions combined with economic austerity and a sense of betrayal toward the elite creates an explosive mixture. Europe experienced this during the inter-war period, though this is not a purely European phenomenon. Disappointment in one’s personal life combined with a feeling of cultural disenfranchisement by outsiders and the sense that the elite is neither honest, nor competent nor committed to the well-being of its own public tends to generate major political reactions anywhere in the world.

Europe has avoided an explosion thus far. But the warning signs are there. Anti-European and anti-immigrant factions existed even during the period when the European Union was functioning, with far-right parties polling up to 16 percent in France. It is not clear that the current crisis has strengthened these elements, but how much this crisis will cost the European public and the absence of miraculous solutions also have not yet become clear. As Italy confronts its crisis, the cost — and the inevitably of the cost — will become clearer.

A large number of elections are scheduled or expected in Europe in 2012 and 2013, including a French presidential election in 2012 and German parliamentary elections in 2013. At the moment, these appear set to be contests between the conventional parties that have dominated Europe since World War II in the West and since 1989 in the East. In general, these are the parties of the elite, all more or less buying into Europe. But anti-European factions have emerged within some of these parties, and as sentiment builds, new parties may form and anti-European factions within existing parties may grow. A crisis of this magnitude cannot happen without Tea Party- and Occupy Wall Street-type factions emerging. In Europe, however — where in addition to economics the crisis is about race, sovereignty, national self-determination and the moral foundations of the European Union — these elements will be broader and more intense.

Populist sentiment coupled with racial and cultural concerns is the classic foundation for right-wing nationalist parties. The European left in general is part of the pro-European elite. Apart from small fragments, very little of the left hasn’t bought into Europe. It is the right that has earned a meaningful following by warning about Europe over the past 20 years. It thus would seem reasonable to expect that these factions will become much stronger as the price of the crisis — and who is going to bear it — becomes apparent.

The real question, therefore, is not how the financial crisis works out. It is whether the European project will survive. And that depends on whether the European elite can retain its legitimacy. That legitimacy is not gone by any means, but it is in the process of being tested like never before, and it is difficult to see how the elite retains it. The polls don’t show the trend yet because the magnitude of the impact on individual lives has not manifested itself in most of Europe. When it does show itself, there will be a massive recalculation regarding the worth and standing of the European elite. There will be calls for revenge, and vows of never allowing such a thing to recur.

Regardless of whether the next immediate European crisis is focused on Spain or Italy, it follows that by mid-decade, Europe’s political landscape will have shifted dramatically, with new parties, personalities and values emerging. The United States shares much of this trend, but its institutions are not newly invented. Old and not working creates problems; new and not working is dangerous. Why the United States will take a different path is a subject for another time. Suffice it to say that the magnitude of Europe’s problems goes well beyond finance.

The European crisis is one of sovereignty, cultural identity and the legitimacy of the elite. The financial crisis has several outcomes, all bad. Regardless of which is chosen, the impact on the political system will be dramatic.

Stratfor.com: „The Crisis of Europe and European Nationalism”

Sursa informationala: Stratfor.com

Autor: George Friedman

When I visited Europe in 2008 and before, the idea that Europe was not going to emerge as one united political entity was regarded as heresy by many leaders. The European enterprise was seen as a work in progress moving inevitably toward unification — a group of nations committed to a common fate. What was a core vision in 2008 is now gone. What was inconceivable — the primacy of the traditional nation-state — is now commonly discussed, and steps to devolve Europe in part or in whole (such as ejecting Greece from the eurozone) are being contemplated. This is not a trivial event.

Before 1492, Europe was a backwater of small nationalities struggling over a relatively small piece of cold, rainy land. But one technological change made Europe the center of the international system: deep-water navigation.

The ability to engage in long-range shipping safely allowed businesses on the Continent’s various navigable rivers to interact easily with each other, magnifying the rivers’ capital-generation capacity. Deep-water navigation also allowed many of the European nations to conquer vast extra-European empires. And the close proximity of those nations combined with ever more wealth allowed for technological innovation and advancement at a pace theretofore unheard of anywhere on the planet. As a whole, Europe became very rich, became engaged in very far-flung empire-building that redefined the human condition and became very good at making war. In short order, Europe went from being a cultural and economic backwater to being the engine of the world.

At home, Europe’s growing economic development was exceeded only by the growing ferocity of its conflicts. Abroad, Europe had achieved the ability to apply military force to achieve economic aims — and vice versa. The brutal exploitation of wealth from some places (South America in particular) and the thorough subjugation and imposed trading systems in others (East and South Asia in particular) created the foundation of the modern order. Such alternations of traditional systems increased the wealth of Europe dramatically.

But “engine” does not mean “united,” and Europe’s wealth was not spread evenly. Whichever country was benefitting had a decided advantage in that it had greater resources to devote to military power and could incentivize other countries to ally with it. The result ought to have been that the leading global empire would unite Europe under its flag. It never happened, although it was attempted repeatedly. Europe remained divided and at war with itself at the same time it was dominating and reshaping the world.

The reasons for this paradox are complex. For me, the key has always been the English Channel. Domination of Europe requires a massive land force. Domination of the world requires a navy heavily oriented toward maritime trade. No European power was optimized to cross the channel, defeat England and force it into Europe. The Spanish Armada, the French navy at Trafalgar and the Luftwaffe over Britain all failed to create the conditions for invasion and subjugation. Whatever happened in continental Europe, the English remained an independent force with a powerful navy of its own, able to manipulate the balance of power in Europe to keep European powers focused on each other and not on England (most of the time). And after the defeat of Napoleon, the Royal Navy created the most powerful empire Europe had seen, but it could not, by itself, dominate the Continent. (Other European geographic features obviously make unification of Europe difficult, but all of them have, at one point or another, been overcome. Except for the channel.)

Underlying Tensions

The tensions underlying Europe were bought to a head by German unification in 1871 and the need to accommodate Germany in the European system, of which Germany was both an integral and indigestible part. The result was two catastrophic general wars in Europe that began in 1914 and ended in 1945 with the occupation of Europe by the United States and the Soviet Union and the collapse of the European imperial system. Its economy shattered and its public plunged into a crisis of morale and a lack of confidence in the elites, Europe had neither the interest in nor appetite for empire.

Europe was exhausted not only by war but also by the internal psychosis of two of its major components. Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union might well have externally behaved according to predictable laws of geopolitics. Internally, these two countries went mad, slaughtering both their own citizens and citizens of countries they occupied for reasons that were barely comprehensible, let alone rationally explicable. From my point of view, the pressure and slaughter inflicted by two world wars on both countries created a collective mental breakdown.

I realize this is a woefully inadequate answer. But consider Europe after World War II. First, it had gone through about 450 years of global adventure and increasingly murderous wars, in the end squandering everything it had won. Internally, Europe watched a country like Germany — in some ways the highest expression of European civilization — plunge to levels of unprecedented barbarism. Finally, Europe saw the United States move from the edges of history to assume the role of an occupying force. The United States became the envy of the Europeans: stable, wealthy, unified and able to impose its economic, political and military will on major powers on a different continent. (The Russians were part of Europe and could be explained within the European paradigm. So while the Europeans may have disdained the Russians, the Russians were still viewed as poor cousins, part of the family playing by more or less European rules.) New and unprecedented, the United States towered over Europe, which went from dominance to psychosis to military, political and cultural subjugation in a twinkling of history’s eye.

Paradoxically, it was the United States that gave the first shape to Europe’s future, beginning with Western Europe. World War II’s outcome brought the United States and Soviet Union to the center of Germany, dividing it. A new war was possible, and the reality and risks of the Cold War were obvious. The United States needed a united Western Europe to contain the Soviets. It created NATO to integrate Europe and the United States politically and militarily. This created the principle of transnational organizations integrating Europe. The United States also encouraged economic cooperation both within Europe and between North America and Europe — in stark contrast to the mercantilist imperiums of recent history — giving rise to the European Union’s precursors. Over the decades of the Cold War, the Europeans committed themselves to a transnational project to create a united Europe of some sort in a way not fully defined.

There were two reasons for this thrust for unification. The first was the Cold War and collective defense. But the deeper reason was a hope for a European resurrection from the horrors of the 20th century. It was understood that German unification in 1871 created the conflicts and that the division of Germany in 1945 re-stabilized Europe. At the same time, Europe did not want to remain occupied or caught in an ongoing near-war situation. The Europeans were searching for a way to overcome their history.

One problem was the status of Germany. The deeper problem was nationalism. Not only had Europe failed to unite under a single flag via conquest but also World War I had shattered the major empires, creating a series of smaller states that had been fighting to be free. The argument was that it was nationalism, and not just German nationalism, that had created the 20th century. Europe’s task was therefore to overcome nationalism and create a structure in which Europe united and retained unique nations as cultural phenomena and not political or economic entities. At the same time, by embedding Germany in this process, the German problem would be solved as well.

A Means of Redemption

The European Union was designed not simply to be a useful economic tool but also to be a means of European redemption. The focus on economics was essential. It did not want to be a military alliance, since such alliances were the foundation of Europe’s tragedy. By focusing on economic matters while allowing military affairs to be linked to NATO and the United States, and by not creating a meaningful joint-European force, the Europeans avoided the part of their history that terrified them while pursuing the part that enticed them: economic prosperity. The idea was that free trade regulated by a central bureaucracy would suppress nationalism and create prosperity without abolishing national identity. The common currency — the euro — is the ultimate expression of this hope. The Europeans hoped that the existence of some Pan-European structure could grant wealth without surrendering the core of what it means to be French or Dutch or Italian.

Yet even during the post-World War II era of security and prosperity, some Europeans recoiled from the idea of a transfer of sovereignty. The consensus that many in the long line of supporters of European unification believed existed simply didn’t. And today’s euro crisis is the first serious crisis that Europe has faced in the years since, with nationalism beginning to re-emerge in full force.

In the end, Germans are Germans and Greeks are Greeks. Germany and Greece are different countries in different places with different value systems and interests. The idea of sacrificing for each other is a dubious concept. The idea of sacrificing for the European Union is a meaningless concept. The European Union has no moral claim on Europe beyond promising prosperity and offering a path to avoid conflict. These are not insignificant goals, but when the prosperity stops, a large part of the justification evaporates and the aversion to conflict (at least political discord) begins to dissolve.

Germany and Greece each have explanations for why the other is responsible for what has happened. For the Germans, it was the irresponsibility of the Greek government in buying political power with money it didn’t have to the point of falsifying economic data to obtain eurozone membership. For the Greeks, the problem is the hijacking of Europe by the Germans. Germany controls the eurozone’s monetary policy and has built a regulatory system that provides unfair privileges, so the Greeks believe, for Germany’s exports, economic structure and financial system. Each nation believes the other is taking advantage of the situation.

Political leaders are seeking accommodation, but their ability to accommodate each other is increasingly limited by public opinion growing more hostile not only to the particulars of the deal but to the principle of accommodation. The most important issue is not that Germany and Greece disagree (although they do, strongly) but that their publics are increasingly viewing each other as nationals of a foreign power who are pursuing their own selfish interests. Both sides say they want “more Europe,” but only if “more Europe” means more of what they want from the other.

Managing Sacrifice

Nationalism is the belief that your fate is bound up with your nation and your fellow citizens and you have an indifference to the fate of others. What the Europeanists tried to do was create institutions that made choosing between your own and others unnecessary. But they did this not with martial spirit or European myth, which horrified them. They made the argument prudently: You will like Europe because it will be prosperous, and with all of Europe prosperous there will be no need to choose between your nation and other nations. Their greatest claim was that Europe would not require sacrifice. To a people who lived through the 20th century, the absence of sacrifice was enormously seductive.

But, of course, prosperity comes and goes, and as it goes sacrifice is needed. And sacrifice — like wealth — is always unevenly distributed. That uneven distribution is determined not only by necessity but also by those who have power and control over institutions. From a national point of view, it is Germany and France that have the power, with the British happy to be out of the main fray. The weak are the rest of Europe, those who surrendered core sovereignty to the Germans and French and now face the burdens of managing sacrifice.

In the end, Europe will remain an enormously prosperous place. The net worth of Europe — its economic base, its intellectual capital, its organizational capabilities — is stunning. Those qualities do not evaporate. But crisis reshapes how they are managed, operated and distributed. This is now in question. Obviously, the future of the euro is now widely discussed. So the future of the free-trade zone will come to the fore. Germany is a massive economy by itself, exporting more per year than the gross domestic products of most of the world’s other nation-states. Does Greece or Portugal really want to give Germany a blank check to export what it wants with it, or would they prefer managed trade under their control? Play this forward past the euro crisis and the foundations of a unified Europe become questionable.

This is the stuff that banks and politicians need to worry about. The deeper worry is nationalism. European nationalism has always had a deeper engine than simply love of one’s own. It is also rooted in resentment of others. Europe is not necessarily unique in this, but it has experienced some of the greatest catastrophes in history because of it. Historically, the Europeans have hated well. We are very early in the process of accumulating grievances and remembering how to hate, but we have entered the process. How this is played out, how the politicians, financiers and media interpret these grievances, will have great implications for Europe. Out of it may come a broader sense of national betrayal, which was just what the European Union was supposed to prevent.

Renasterea Stangii: case-study Grecia

Actuala criza economica delegitimeaza masurile anti-criza de dreapta si pot duce la legitimarea unui regim stangist intilnit in Bolivia si Venezuela. In sase tari membre UE (Grecia, Italia, Spania, Portugalia, Franta si Germania) partidele de stanga,  si aici ma refer in mod expres la partidele comuniste, neocomuniste si la fenomenul politic „Noua Stanga”. sunt pe cale de a profita de criza capitalismului, de aceasta criza de sistem, si pe fundalul acestei criza in flancul sudic al Uniunii Europene pot emana regimuri de stanga.

Case-study Grecia:

Luni 3 mai 2010 simpatizanti si militanti ai Partidului Comunist Grec au reusit sa ocupe dealul Akropolis si au afisat un banner care ne aminteste de timpuri de mult apuse.

Este arhicunoscut faptul ca ideea comunista este populara in Grecia si in Cipru. Implozia socialismului eradicat in tariile Pactului de la Varsovia nu a afectat atractivitatea doctrinei comuniste.

In opozitie cu doctrina stalinist-arhaica practicata de Partidul Comunist Roman, si in mare parte continuata de Partidul Socialist al Muncii, respectiv de „Alianta Socialista”, comunistii greci proiecteaza doctrina eurocomunista, care gradual accepta piata ca factor de distributie, dar cu agenti economici de statul. Despre imperiul economic al Partidului Comunist Elen nu sunt cunoscute foarte multe detalii, dar capacitatea de campanie si logistica de partid, existenta unei retele electorale disciplinate si in permanenta activa (sindicate, asociatii profesionale, organizatii de elevi, tineret si de studenti) proiecteaza ideea unei substante comerciale considerabile.

In perioada 45-74 insurectia comunista din Grecia a fost suprimata prin interventii militare care au culminat in razboiul civil desfasurat intre 1946-50. Militanta comunista a continuat si numai instaurarea unei dictaturi militare in perioada 1967-74 a stopat eradicarea unei stat elen comunist.

Perioada democratica a legitimat existenta comunismului elen. Diferende doctrinare a dus la eradicarea unui partid gen „Noua Stanga”, sub titulatura SYNAPSOS.

In perioada 1950-67 Partidul Comunist Elen a fost interzis. Cu toate acestea comunistii eleni au participat la o serie de scrutinuri in aliante electorale care au reunit toate curentele stangiste.

In 1956 pe fundalul clivajului politic intre monarhisti si republicani, comunistii eleni au participat pe liste comune cu alte formatiuni republicane printre care figurau formatiuniile liberale si de centru-stanga.

Rezultatele electorale sunt urmatoarele:

1926

KKE, 4,37% (41.982 VVE) 10 mandate

1928

KKE, 1,4%, 0 mandate

1929 – Alegeri pentru Senat

KKE, 1,7%, o mandate

1932

KKE, 4,97% (58.223 VVE) 10 mandate

1932 Alegeri pentru Senat

KKE, 3,91%, 0 mandate

1933

KKE, 4,5%, o mandate

1935

KKE, 9,59%, o mandate

1936

KKE, 5,8%, 15 mandate

1951

EDA (Alianta Stangii), 10,57%, 10 mandate

1952

EDA (Alianta Stangii Unite), 9,55%, 29 mandate

1956

Alianta Democrat-Liberala, 48,15% (1.620.007 VVE) 132 mandate

1958

EDA (Stanga Unita), 24,42%, 73 mandate

1963

EDA (Stanga Unita), 14,34%, 43 mandate

1964

EDA (Stanga Unita), 11,80%, 22 mandate

1974

Eniea Aristera (Stanga Unita) 9,47% (464.787 VVE) 8 mandate

1977

KKE, 9,36% (480.282 VVE) 11 mandate

SYNAPSO, 2,72% (139.356 VVE) 2 mandate

1981

KKE, 10,93% (620.302 VVE) 13 mandate

1981 – Alegeri europarlamentare

KKE, 12,84% (729.052 VVE) 3 mandate

SYNAPSOS, 5,30% (300.841 VVE) 1 mandat

PDE  (Partidul Socialismului Democratic) 4,26% (241.666 VVE) 1 mandat

1985

KKE, 9,1% (629.525 VVE) 12 mandate

SYNAPSOS, 1,8% (117.135 VVE) 1 mandat

06/1989

Alianta Stangii Unite, 13,1% (855.944 VVE) 28 mandate

11/1989

Alianta Stangii Unite, 11% (734.611 VVE) 21 mandate

1990

Alianta Stangii Unite, 10,3% (677.059 VVE) 19 mandate

SYNAPSOS. 1% (66.861 VVE) 4 mandate

1993

KKE, 4,54% (313.001 VVE) 9 mandate

1996

KKE, 5,61% (380.167 VVE) 11 mandate

SYNAPSOS, 5,12% (347.051 VVE) 10 mandate

Miscarea Social-Democrata, 4,43% (300.617 VVE) 9 mandate

2000

KKE, 5,52% (379.454 VVE) 11 mandate

SYNAPSOS, 3,20% (219.880 VVE) 6 mandate

2004

KKE, 5,9% (436.573 VVE) 12 mandate

SYNAPSOS, 3,3% (241.539 VVE) 6 mandate

2007

KKE, 8,15% (583.815 VVE) 22 mandate

SYNAPSOS, 5,04% (361.211 VVE) 14 mandate

2009

KKE, 7,54% (517.154 VVE) 21 mandate

SYNAPSOS, 4,6% (315.627 VVE) 13 mandate

Sinteza: Falimentul de stat creeaza suportul electoral care in functie de conjuctura poate erupe la alegerea unui parlament elen cu o larga majoritate de stanga.

Grecia are urmatoarele probleme structurale:

– Agricultura de subsistenta, piata interna agricola este dependenta de importuri

– Epoca moderna este determinat de trei bancrute de stat: 1893, 1932 si 2010

– Subventiile UE nu si-au atins targetul. Administratia publica este corupta si ineficienta

– Clivajul politic este determinat de stanga socialdemocrat vs. dreapta neoconservatoare

– Grecia este o democratie de conflict, orice compromis este sortit esecului.

Gabriel Savulescu

05.05.2010

 

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